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When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail:
Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural
Nonpoint Source Water Pollution
Douglas R. Williams*
For most of its thirty-year life-span, the Clean Water Act s
(CWA) program for controlling pollution from industrial facilities
and municipal water treatment plants has been the primary focus of
federal water pollution control law and policy. While the wisdom of
this program for controlling point sources through technologybased effluent limitations has been roundly debated, there is little
question that it has yielded sizeable gains in water quality. It is now
clear, however, that the CWA s emphasis on controlling discharges
from point sources has not achieved the level of cleanup at which the
CWA aims.1 Moreover, further water quality gains from the control
of point sources, while certainly not exhausted, are likely to be too
limited, too costly, or both, to achieve water quality objectives.2
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to my colleagues at
Saint Louis University who participated in a workshop presentation of this Article. Special
thanks to Constance Wagner, Melissa Cole, and Dan Hulseboch for their helpful comments.
Thanks also to NAELS for the invitation to participate in this exceptionally well-run
conference. This Article was prepared for the 2002 National Association of Environmental Law
Societies (NAELS) Conference: Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future held at
Washington University School of Law in St. Louis on March 15-17, 2002.
1. On the extent of current water quality problems, see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS
(2000), at http://www.epa.gov/305b/98report/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2002) [hereinafter 1998
WATER QUALITY REPORT]; U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY & U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE, CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN: RESTORING AND PROTECTING AMERICA S
WATERS 9 (1998), at http://www.cleanwater.gov/action/cwap.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2002)
[hereinafter CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN].
2. The EPA and USDA have concluded that implementation of the existing programs
will not stop serious new threats to public health, living resources, and the nation s waterways,
particularly from polluted run off. These programs lack the strength, resources, and framework
to finish the job of restoring rivers, lakes, and coastal areas. To fulfill the original goal of the
Clean Water Act fishable and swimmable water for every American the nation must chart
a new course to address the pollution problems of the next generation. 1998 WATER QUALITY
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The gist of the nation s current water quality problems is the
absence of effective measures to control nonpoint source pollution
the diffuse and pervasive streams of pollutants that enter our waters
over broad expanses of land and through the air, rather than from a
discrete and identifiable point, such as a pipe or ditch.3 Agricultural
activities are deeply implicated in this problem. Farmers and
ranchers control how most of our land is used and managed . . . .
They are, literally, the most important soil, water, fish, wildlife, and
recreational managers in the U.S. 4 They have not, however, been
particularly good stewards of our water resources: excessive or
inappropriate use of fertilizers and pesticides, soil erosion, habitat
alteration, soil salinization, animal wastes, and rates of water usage
are causing serious water quality problems throughout the country.5
Indeed, agricultural nonpoint source pollution is now considered the
nation s most persistent and most difficult water quality problem.6
Farms occupy a special place in the imagination of most
Americans, evoking ideas about closeness to land and water
resources, fierce independence, and a strong stewardship ethic.7
Across the country, states and local governments are concerned with
losses of prime agricultural land, giving rise to right-to-farm
legislation and other measures to protect farmland from encroaching
REPORT, supra note 1, at i; see also Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 28 (2001); Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to
Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 203-04
(1999) [hereinafter Alder, Integrated Approaches]; Drew Caputo, A Job Half Finished: The
Clean Water Act After 25 Years, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. 10574 (Nov. 1997); William F. Pedersen, Jr.,
Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69 (1988).
3. See 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at ES-3 (identifying nonpoint
source pollution as the leading cause of water quality impairments).
4. Craig A. Cox, What Should be the Role of Resource Stewardship in Future Farm
Policy?, presentation at the USDA Agricultural Outlook Forum 2001 (Feb. 22, 2001), at
http://www.swcs.org/t_advocacy_cox_speech.htm.
5. C. Ford Runge, Environmental Protection From Farm to Market, in THINKING
ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 200, 204 (Marian R.
Chertow & Danial C. Esty eds., 1997); J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 274-91 (2000).
6. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TARGETING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES IN
AGRICULTURE: REFORMING PROGRAM STRATEGIES 11 (1995) [hereinafter TARGETING
ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES].
7. For a critical view of these myths, see Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling
Environmental from Economic Objectives in Agricultural Regulation, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 333
(1995).
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urban development.8 It is against these waves of solicitude,
admiration, and concern for the well-being of farmers and their
farms, and the political muscle of the agricultural industry, that
environmental law must navigate. As the EPA recently observed:
Agriculture is recognized in watersheds across the country as a
source of nonpoint source pollution. On the other hand,
agricultural land is recognized in many areas as a preferred
use for environment, social, and economic purposes.
Addressing problems caused by various agricultural activities
while maintaining the overall, long-term sustainability of the
environment and the industry presents special challenges.9
To date, farms have largely escaped direct regulation under
federal and state environmental law.10 Instead, a patchwork of
voluntary incentive programs implemented by myriad federal and
state agencies, such as the provision of green payments in the
billions of dollars to subsidize the costs of implementing pollutionreducing practices or to retire environmentally valuable resources
from agricultural use, has been the primary method of inducing more
water-protective behavior from farmers.11 This limited offering of
incentives is, quite simply, not enough; if the United States is to make
significant further progress toward attaining water quality objectives,
8. See Ruhl, supra note 5, at 315-16.
9. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 68.
10. For a detailed discussion of the safe harbors agriculture has enjoyed under federal
environmental law, see Ruhl, supra note 5, at 293-316. See also Runge, supra note 5; Chen,
supra note 7, at 350-51; Margaret Rosso Grossman, Agriculture and the Environment in the
United States, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 291 (1994 Supp.).
11. See Robin Kundis Craig, Local or National? The Increasing Federalization of
Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 179, 190-91 (2000) (quoting
OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, SECTION 319 SUCCESS STORIES 1
(Nov. 1994) ( [U]nder the Clean Water Act, nonpoint source control is largely voluntary, not
regulatory as is point source control. ); James Boyd, The New Face of the Clean Water Act: A
Critical Review of the EPA s New TMDL Rules, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL Y F. 39, 66 (2000)
( To date, state initiatives [to control nonpoint source pollution] have relied heavily on
voluntary, unenforceable measures, particularly with regard to agricultural runoff. ); Debra L.
Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201, 283
(1996) ( Nonpoint source pollution control . . . consists largely of vague plans and voluntary
programs. ); David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control:
The Clean Water Act s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 528 (1996)
( [T]he programs in place to reduce nonpoint source pollution remain completely voluntary. ).
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efforts to control nonpoint source pollution must be expanded.
To be sure, there have been significant federal and state efforts to
work just such an expansion of existing control measures, to reach
beyond point sources, and to adopt a much more aggressive stance
toward control of nonpoint source pollution. Congress has amended
the CWA to include programs that target nonpoint sources.12 More
recently, the Clinton Administration placed control of nonpoint
source pollution at the center of its 1998 Clean Water Action Plan,
emphasizing the need for watershed planning and holistic approaches
to water quality improvements.13 The Bush Administration has
recently pledged new initiatives to improve water quality, echoing the
Clean Water Action Plan s emphasis on watershed-based controls,
but the details of this initiative have yet to be worked out.14 The EPA
has launched new initiatives to capture more animal feeding
operations within the CWA s regulatory orbit,15 and the agency s
controversial TMDL rules have generated a new round of debate
about how, and to what extent, the EPA can cajole the states into
bringing agricultural and other nonpoint sources within the CWA s
regulatory web.16 The states, too, have begun to address nonpoint
source pollution in a more aggressive way, suggesting that the
longstanding carrot, not stick approach to dealing with this major
12. See text accompanying infra notes 251-90.
13. CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at iii.
14. See Cat Lazaroff, $21 Million Pledged for Watershed Protection, Envtl. News Serv.
(Jan. 28, 2002), at http://ens-news.com/ens/jan2002/2002L-01-28-06.html.
15. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed.
Reg. 2960, 3005 (Jan. 12, 2001) [hereinafter National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System].
16. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and
Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of
Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586
(July 13, 2000) [hereinafter TMDL Rule]; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ASSESSING THE
TMDL APPROACH TO WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT 1, available at http://www.cpa.
gov/owo/tmdl/NRC (June 15, 2001) [hereinafter ASSESSING THE TMDL APPROACH] (noting
that EPA is obligated to implement the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program, the
objective of which is attainment of ambient water quality standards through the control of both
point and nonpoint sources of pollution. ). The literature on the TMDL program is quickly
becoming enormous. See, e.g., OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM:
LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION (1999) [hereinafter HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM]; WESLEY
M. JARRELL, GETTING STARTED WITH TMDLS (1999), at http://216.68.81.171
/852568CB0010F86A/web+by+document+type/624A8A3F0E40805F85256A21007A0572?Op
en (last visited Mar. 30, 2002) [hereinafter GETTING STARTED].
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pollution problem may be wearing a bit thin.17
The increased attention given to controlling nonpoint source
pollution has not yet, however, translated into either widespread
demonstrable results or clearly defined, coherent regulatory
programs. A large and looming question concerns the extent to which
a shift from voluntary, incentive-based policies to direct regulation is
necessary to achieve needed water quality improvements, and
whether existing statutory authorities are sufficient to work such a
transition.
This Article considers the extent to which more direct federal
regulation of agricultural nonpoint source pollution is warranted. My
first conclusion is that an increased federal presence is necessary.
Many states have been reluctant to impose direct controls on
agricultural nonpoint source pollution for a variety of reasons,
including the relative political power of agricultural interests at the
local and state level.18 In addition, nonpoint source pollution often
implicates interstate waters or contributes to downstream water
quality deterioration; in such circumstances, coordination among
states is difficult and incentives to regulate often are lacking.19
Minimum enforceable federal requirements would obviate these
difficulties.
My second conclusion is that the costs of implementing such
plans and practices should be distributed in a pragmatic way that
recognizes the extraordinary organizational presence and political
clout of the agricultural industry. In this vein, it is unrealistic to
expect that an unflinching application of the polluter pays principle
will yield effective programs. Accordingly, existing federal and state
cost-sharing and land acquisition programs should be retained and, in
some cases, expanded. Taxes on polluting inputs such as fertilizer
17. See ENVTL. LAW INST., PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: STATE NONPOINT SOURCE
ENFORCEABLE MECHANISMS IN CONTEXT 1, available at http://www.eli.org/pdf/
nonpointstateenfmech.PDF (June 2000) (concluding that relying on voluntary . . . [programs]
has proven to be an incomplete strategy in many cases [to control nonpoint source pollution] )
[hereinafter PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER].
18. See MARC O. RIBAUDO ET AL., ECONOMICS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION FROM
NONPOINT SOURCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE, USDA AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC REP. NO.
782, at 29 (Nov. 1999), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/epubs/pdf/aer782/aer782.pdf
[hereinafter RIBANDO, ECONOMICS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION].
19. See id. at 30-31.

26

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 9:21

and feed products that contribute to nonpoint source pollution could
supplement these programs.
Third, measures that promise water quality improvements beyond
baseline regulatory requirements should be encouraged. Innovative
programs such as point-nonpoint source pollution trading programs
may yield sizeable environmental benefits at reduced costs, and states
should be free to experiment with this sort of alternative.
Part I of this Article describes existing water quality impairments
and the part agricultural nonpoint source pollution has played in
causing such impairments. Part II describes existing federal efforts to
control agricultural nonpoint source pollution. Part III proposes a new
regulatory structure that builds upon the basic elements of the current
TMDL program.
The approach recommended here is not, however, simply a
traditional command and control program based on uniform
standards, although important elements of the proposal bear these
features. The traditional criticisms of command and control
regulation are now familiar: its relative insensitivity to small (or
large) variations from one geographic area to another and from one
regulated activity to another, resulting in inefficient use of resources;
its relative lack of flexibility ; its generally top-down approach,
creating barriers to meaningful citizen participation and stifling state
authority and the possibility of innovative state programs.20
Undoubtedly, from an idealist perspective, prescriptive regulation is
oftentimes clumsy, can be authoritarian, and may impose mandates
that do not always fit well with the problem they address (even in
some cases putting in place mechanisms that have unintended
consequences that exacerbate, rather than diminish, environmental
and health problems).21 Direct regulation may also generate
20. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988); Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333
(1985).
21. This is not to say, however, that alternative approaches would perform any better or
more efficiently. For a defense of command and control regulatory programs to address water
pollution, see Caputo, supra note 2, at 10578-80; Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of
Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83 (2000); and Sidney A. Shapiro &
Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation,
1991 DUKE L.J. 729.
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significant resistance and resentment on the part of the regulated
community, which in many cases may rightly (but sometimes
wrongly) take issue with the idea that appropriate solutions can be
better devised by government bureaucrats than by those who know
and work the land. These features of direct regulation also tend to
make implementation both costly and difficult; confrontation and
litigation characteristically burden the progress of such prescriptive
programs.
Moreover, the traditional criticisms of direct federal regulation
have resonated strongly in the nonpoint source pollution context. The
variety of practices that contribute to nonpoint source pollution are
ubiquitous and diverse. Even within the agricultural component of
this problem, the sheer number of farms, their very different practices
and locations in the landscape, and their varying potential for water
quality impacts make a technology-based approach with uniform
effluent limitations appear quite fantastical. The practices that
contribute most to nonpoint source pollution are patterns of land use,
the control of which has been guarded jealously by local government
authorities, making direct federal control at best a touchy political
proposition.22 Current federal programs to control nonpoint source
pollution are the product of judgments that controls of this sort
should remain with state and local authorities, as has been the
traditional practice. Much of the federal effort has been to induce the
states to implement such controls by offering cost-sharing
arrangements and technical assistance.
On the other side, the current approach to agricultural nonpoint
source pollution depends much too heavily on voluntary participation
and has not induced adequate changes in agricultural practices to
yield acceptable outcomes. These shortcomings may be due to the
inadequacies of the incentives offered: the unsubsidized costs of
implementing control measures may remain too high, in reality or in
perception, to induce the desired change in behavior. Billions of
dollars have been poured into incentive-based programs, and the
results have not been encouraging. It is not realistic to expect
22. Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can it Be
Done?, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 482 (1989) ( any control applied to nonpoint sources is a
land use control because it reduces nonpoint pollution through measures that modify land use ).

28

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 9:21

taxpayers to approve the massive increase in spending that is likely to
be required to improve the rates at which farmers and others are
willing to participate in conservation practices. Moreover, the notion
that farmers must be bribed to engage in sound, conservationminded practices has had the subtle effect of promoting the idea that
farmers have a right to engage in environmentally destructive
practices and must be paid to change those practices. A baseline
shift to regulatory programs that implicitly assign entitlements to
cleaner water to citizens may, of course, face obstacles that generally
accompany such alterations of the status quo ante. In its extreme
form, such a baseline shift might be characterized as a bureaucratic
effort to take farmers rights to the use of their property.23
Voluntary incentives may also fail because farmers may resist
changing longstanding practices or perceive such programs as the
product of intrusive intermeddlers. In these circumstances, targeted
populations may even reject win-win strategies that deliver
environmental improvements while bolstering the bottom line.
Whatever the reason, existing voluntary programs have too few
volunteers to advance the program s primary objectives in any
significant way. Perhaps most troublesome, the take it or leave it
incentives relied on by current programs have tended to minimize the
harmful character of the practices against which the incentives are
designed to operate, suggesting implicitly that program objectives
are, in the end, not so important after all. The cumulative effect of
this message may be to lock-in practices, making them highly
resilient against efforts at change.24
23. See United States v. Larkins, 852 F.2d 189, 194 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt, J.,
concurring).
The framers of the Constitution were solicitous of the rights of landowners especially
small farmers struggling for survival not to have land appropriated by the
government. They therefore adopted the provision of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.
On the notion that takings claims should be based on regulatory disruptions of normal uses
of property, see Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121 (1996)
(reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS
(1995)).
24. See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects In Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 813, 813
(1998) ( If institutions become too routinized . . . they may be unable to adapt to changes in the
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The difficulties with both regulatory and voluntary approaches
make conclusions about an optimal mix of control strategies difficult.
In my view, Robert Percival has it just about right when he says that
the best approach to regulation is to employ a mix of regulatory
strategies that varies depending upon the problem being addressed
and the relative importance of the various values served by each
approach. 25 The reforms I suggest here attempt to build on that
insight, permitting a great deal of flexibility in the design of programs
to control agricultural nonpoint source pollution, while insisting on
several core minimum regulatory requirements. Ultimately, in my
view, we should worry less about whether programs are regulatory
or voluntary and more about whether the programs are
environmentally sound, fair, and cost-effective. Once minimally
acceptable allocations of rights are established, there is
considerable room for a variety of regulatory, incentive-based, and
private contractual mechanisms to be used.26
Finally, romantic notions of farms and farmers may contribute to
the difficulty in effecting a baseline shift. We must recognize that, to
a significant degree, the reigning idyllism of farms and farmers is
based on a lost history. It is also time to recognize that existing
programs have given farms and farmers ample opportunities to
reform unsustainable practices, often through generous taxpayer
subsidies. However, agriculture s response has been less one of
seeking effective solutions than of resisting efforts at change. As
Linda Malone has noted:
There is still a place in American culture to revere and honor
the American farmer. Yet whatever favored position remains
for the farmer in our society, it is rooted in the Jeffersonian
ideal of agriculture as the friend, not foe, of nature. As
agriculture has distanced itself from the land - with corporate,
underlying conditions they seek to organize or accommodate. When an institution fails to
adjust, we can say . . . that it has become locked-in. ).
25. Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy,
1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 190 (1997).
26. See Bonnie G. Colby & Tamra Pearson d Estrée, Evaluating Market Transactions,
Litigation, and Regulation as Tools for Implementing Environmental Restoration, 42 ARIZ. L.
REV. 381, 382-86 (2000). See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
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absentee, non-organic farm management - the reverence for
agriculture in American society has diminished. It is not the
American public which has forgotten Jefferson s vision, but
agriculture itself.27
I. WATER QUALITY AND AGRICULTURAL NONPOINT SOURCE
POLLUTION
The Clean Water Act s direct regulation of industrial and
municipal sewage discharges and its emphasis on technology-based
standards have undoubtedly produced large water quality benefits.
Discharges of toxic materials into surface waters reportedly have
been reduced substantially.28 Impressive reductions in fecal bacteria,
phosphorus, ammonia, and other conventional pollutants have also
been reported.29 The number of persons served by wastewater
treatment plans, which reduce the burden on water quality associated
with pollutants in human waste streams, has more than doubled.30
Similarly, the Clean Water Act s section 404 Dredged and Fill
Material Permit Program,31 which is the nation s primary means of
protecting wetlands, has importantly affected the rate of wetland
degradation and destruction. These efforts to achieve a no net loss
of wetland functions and values32 may have incidentally prevented
significant water quality decrements due to nonpoint source
pollution.33 While there is no shortage of strong criticism for the
27. Linda A. Malone, Reflections on the Jeffersonian Ideal of an Agrarian Democracy
and the Emergence of an Agricultural and Environmental Ethic in the 1990 Farm Bill, 12
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 49 (1993). See generally Chen, supra note 7.
28. RIBAUDO, supra note 18, at 3; see also CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at
4 (toxic pollutants reduced by 24 million tons annually).
29. Id.; see RIBAUDO, supra note 18, at 3-4.
30. EPA, The Clean Water Act: A Brief History (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/
owow/cwa/history.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
32. See Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and
the Department of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean
Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, available at http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/functions/
cw/cecwo/reg/moafe90.htm (Feb. 6, 1990) (describing goal of the section 404 program as no
overall net loss of the nation s remaining wetlands base ).
33. On the water quality benefits associated with wetlands functional capacity to control
nonpoint source pollution, see generally EPA, NATIONAL MANAGEMENT MEASURES TO
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manner in which this program has been implemented, the program
undoubtedly has placed some obstacles in the path of the otherwise
relentless urge to drain and fill precious ecological resources.34
Annual rates of wetlands losses are now twenty-five percent of what
they were prior to the passage of the CWA.35
But the objective of the CWA is not only to reduce, or even to
eliminate, point source discharges, nor to put some brakes on the
destruction of wetlands. The objective is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation s waters. 36
Stated in more concrete terms, the minimally acceptable outcome to
be achieved by the CWA is water quality which provides for the
protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
provides for recreation in and on the water 37 in short, waters that
are fishable and swimmable. 38 Sadly, we are nowhere near
attaining that objective.
A. The Limits of Current Information
There is a consensus that a significant number of the nation s
waters are currently not meeting water quality standards. Before
discussing what we know about the state of the nation s waters, it is
useful to consider just how much we do not know. In fact, our
knowledge of existing water quality conditions is alarmingly thin,
making quantitative measures of progress and deterioration, to some
extent, speculative. Indeed, the lack of adequate monitoring and
water quality assessment data are substantial obstacles to an effective
PROTECT AND RESTORE WETLANDS AND RIPARIAN AREAS FOR THE ABATEMENT OF NONPOINT
SOURCE POLLUTION, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/wetmeasures/ (Draft, June 21,
2001); EPA, NATIONAL GUIDANCE WETLANDS AND NONPOINT SOURCE CONTROL PROGRAMS,
available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/wlnps.html (June 1990).
34. On the status and trends of wetland losses, see US FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, 2001
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS
UNITED STATES 1986 TO 1997 (2001), available at http://wetlands.fws.gov/bha/SandT/
SandTReport.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
35. CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 1.
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
37. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
38. See 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. The stated objectives apply
to surface waters. Groundwater quality is another matter and a very large one (see id. at 15798) that I do not expressly address in this Article.
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program to improve water quality39 and, as I shall argue below, bear
importantly on the question of what types of water quality policies
are likely to operate most effectively and fairly.
The lack of adequate water quality assessment data is largely due
to limited resources; state and federal agencies simply do not have
the staff or funding to support comprehensive water quality
assessments. Also, many problems with water quality data are the
product of the current regulatory structure.
In its latest report to Congress, the EPA reported that states had
assessed only twenty-three percent of river miles, forty-two percent
of lake acres, thirty-two percent of estuary square miles, and five
percent of ocean shoreline miles to determine whether water quality
standards were being met.40 Even this distressingly meager data set
overstates the extent of our knowledge about existing water quality.
Water quality assessments41 are not always the product of actual
monitoring, and are not performed in a consistent manner from one
state to the next.42 Sampling from different water bodies, differences
in data gathering protocols, and other less defensible factors also
contribute to differences in reported water quality over time.43 The
39. For an extensive discussion of the inadequacy of existing water quality monitoring
programs, see Adler, supra note 2, at 257-63.
40. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. A useful, and more manageable,
source of information, based on the 1998 Water Quality Report, is EPA, THE QUALITY OF OUR
NATION S WATERS (2000), at http://www.epa.gov/305b/98report/98brochure.pdf (last visited
Mar. 31, 2002).
41. Section 305(b)(E) of the CWA requires each state to submit biennial reports to EPA.
The reports must include information on water quality within the state, an analysis of whether
water quality objectives will be achieved by the CWA s requirements, and any
recommendations for additional action where necessary to achieve those objectives; estimates
of the costs of achieving CWA objectives; and a description of the nature and extent of
nonpoint sources of pollutants, and recommendations as to the programs which must be
undertaken to control each category of such sources, including an estimate of the costs of
implementing such programs. 33 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(E) (1994).
42. See Adler, supra note 2, at 253-54 (noting the absence of a consistent set of rules and
procedures by which states monitor ambient [water] quality and reach judgments about whether
or not the standard is met ).
43. RIBAUDO, ECONOMICS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION, supra note 18, at 5; see
also 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 4; Adler, supra note 2, at 254 ( [E]ven if
two states have identical was [water quality standards] for a given pollutant, water bodies might
be listed [as impaired] in one state but not the other, based only on differences in the methods,
frequency, and location of monitoring or on different criteria for deciding what constitutes a
violation. ).
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current system for monitoring state waters has been described as
highly variable in both water bodies assessed and methods of
assessment. Furthermore, it is virtually unsupervised by EPA, and a
game of politics, bureaucratic inertia and bad science leading to
erroneous and manipulated sets of water quality data. 44 According
to a recent report by the General Accounting Office, [w]hat is
uncertain . . . is the precise extent of water quality problems, where
and what the most severe problems are, and the location of highquality waters that need to be protected. 45 If we are to establish
programs for improving water quality that are applied evenhandedly
both in terms of those who must do the hard work of pollution control
and those who bear the brunt of the remaining pollution,
comprehensive and consistent water quality monitoring and
assessment are the first order of business.46
Our understanding of existing water quality is hampered by the
absence of consistent benchmarks against which determinations of
impairment are made. Under the current regulatory framework,
judgments about water quality are based on water quality standards,
which may vary significantly from state to state. While some
minimum federal standards apply, they are inadequate to ensure
consistent judgments about water quality.
Water quality standards consist of three elements: use
designations, water quality criteria, and an antidegradation policy.47
Use designations under the CWA essentially amount to state-by44. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 138 (quoting PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY, MURKY WATERS, OFFICIAL WATER QUALITY REPORTS
ARE ALL WET: AN INSIDE LOOK AT EPA S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 2, 3
(1999)).
45. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER QUALITY: KEY EPA AND STATE DECISIONS
LIMITED BY INCONSISTENT AND INCOMPLETE DATA, GAO/RCED-00-54, at 6 (2000). For
related views concerning the quality of existing state-generated data on water quality, see
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 16, at 16 (noting limits on state data). For a
description of various programs to monitor water quality, see CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN,
supra note 1, at 8-9.
46. Adler, supra note 2, at 263.
47. 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (2001). For a good, concise discussion of these elements of water
quality standards, see Karen M. Wardzinski et al., Water Pollution Control Under the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, in THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 8, 26-33
(Parthenia B. Evans ed., 1994). See also Adler, supra note 2, at 210-13.
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state zoning of the Nation s surface waters. 48 Unlike the Clean Air
Act, which mandates that air quality be assessed against federallypromulgated ambient standards,49 the CWA reflects the judgment that
the appropriate level of water quality may be based on the normative
choices each state makes for the uses of waters within its
jurisdiction.50 At a minimum, however, states must take into
consideration the use and value of water for public water supplies,
protection and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife, recreation
in and on the water, agricultural, industrial, and other purposes
including navigation. Additionally, states may not adopt waste
transport or waste assimilation as a designated use. 51 Designated
uses are, as part of a state s water quality standards, subject to
approval by EPA, which enjoys the final voice on the standard s
adequacy. 52
Examples of use designations include aquatic life support,
drinking water supply, fish consumption, shellfish harvesting,
primary contact recreation (e.g., swimming), secondary contact
recreation (e.g., boating), agriculture, groundwater recharge, and
wildlife habitat.53 In addition to the prohibition on designating waters
as waste disposal sites, states may not select designated uses that are
inconsistent with the fishable/swimmable objectives of the CWA.
This limitation is avoided, however, if the state demonstrates that
such minimally acceptable uses are not feasibly attainable due to one
of six specific conditions.54
The wide range of choices available to the states in designating
uses of water bodies makes statements about how many waters are
impaired a radically incomplete picture of the overall state of the
nation s water resources. A state that has chosen a less protective use
48. Adler, supra note 2, at 209 (quoting Mississippi v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1275 (5th
Cir. 1980)).
49. See generally Douglas R. Williams, Cooperative Federalism and the Clean Air Act: A
Defense of Minimum Federal Standards, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 67 (2001); Adler, supra
note 2, at 251-53.
50. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2001).
51. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(a).
52. Mississippi v. Costle, 625 F.2d at 1275; see 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2).
53. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
54. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(g); see David S. Baron, Water Quality Standards for Rivers and
Lakes: Emerging Issues, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 559, 567-71 (1995).
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designation may conclude that a waterbody is meeting water quality
standards, while a downstream state, looking at a different segment of
the same water body may conclude that the water is impaired. While
it may certainly be appropriate to permit variation from state to state
on the preferred uses for waters, such variation may raise an issue as
to the equitable distribution of cleanup responsibilities between
upstream and downstream water users.55
The second element of water quality standards, water quality
criteria (WQC), is central to water quality assessment and water
quality-based control strategies. WQC are an expression of the
minimally adequate ambient water conditions deemed necessary to
support designated uses; the WQC criteria thus represent the ambient
benchmarks at which pollution controls are aimed.56 These criteria
can be expressed in a variety of ways: numerically, as pollutantspecific ambient concentrations and toxicity levels, or in narrative
form, such as no toxic pollutants in toxic amounts. 57
Uncertainty pervades efforts to link narrative and quantitative
criteria to designated uses.58 The current regulatory structure tolerates
wildly inconsistent judgments about these linkages. Consider, on this
point, the Fourth Circuit s decision in Natural Resources Defense
55. See Adler, supra note 2, at 253. Cf. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 111 (1992)
(noting that [i]f every discharge that had some theoretical impact on a downstream State were
interpreted as degrading the downstream waters, downstream States might wield an effective
veto over upstream discharges ).
56. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A); American Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 349
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
57. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A); American Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 349
(D.C. Cir. 1993). EPA has been experimenting with new approaches to developing water
criteria, including sediment criteria and biological water . . . criteria. See Adler, supra note 2,
at 212. For toxic pollutants, the CWA mandates the use of biological criteria if numeric criteria
are unavailable. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B). EPA has also recently developed guidelines for
water quality standards for wetlands. See EPA, NATIONAL GUIDANCE: WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS FOR WETLANDS (June 1990), at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/
regs/quality.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL GUIDANCE].
58. American Paper Inst., 996 F.2d at 351 (narrative criteria). See generally ROBERT
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 704-05 (3d ed.
2000); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND ENVIRONMENT:
ACHIEVING COMPLEMENTARY POLICIES 74 (1995) [hereinafter AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND
ENVIRONMENT]; HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 136-42; Wendy E. Wagner,
Restoring Polluted Waters with Public Values, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL Y REV. 429,
438 (2000); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 10469 (Aug.
1999).
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Council v. EPA,59 in which the court rejected challenges to the EPA s
approval of Maryland s and Virginia s water quality criteria for
dioxin. The states concluded that designated uses could be supported
at ambient dioxin concentrations that were one thousand times higher
than the concentrations established in prior EPA guidance.60 Quite
obviously, such a marked disparity in judgments about water quality
criteria casts substantial doubt on conclusions regarding water
segment impairment based upon ambient concentrations of one or
more pollutants, even when good ambient data are available.61
The problem is exacerbated with narrative criteria, which
necessarily call for judgments about the amount of a pollutant that is
tolerable under standards that do not themselves articulate clear
levels. Experience with narrative criteria in the related context of
establishing permit conditions on point source discharges show that
such judgments may be wildly inconsistent from one regulator to the
59. 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993)
60. EPA guidance specified an ambient concentration of .0013 parts per quadrillion (ppq);
Maryland and Virginia adopted a 1.2 ppq criterion. See id. at 1398-99. As the court explained:
numeric water criteria, such as the 1.2 ppq and .0013 ppq standards, are based on an
assessment of the dose of dioxin that may cause harm and the dose to humans that can
be expected as a result of dioxin present in water. Six factors are considered in
determining the numeric dioxin criteria: (1) cancer potency; (2) risk level; (3) fish
consumption; (4) bioconcentration; (5) water intake; and (6) body weight. . . .
The .0013 ppq figure is taken from EPA s dioxin criteria guidance document, Ambient
Water Quality Criteria for 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin, published in 1984
( 1984 dioxin criteria document ). In this document, EPA summarized the scientific
information available in 1984 regarding dioxin toxicity and provided useful
information for the states to use in adopting their own water quality standards. EPA
recommended that where bodies of water are used as a source for both drinking water
and edible fish, a dioxin concentration of .0013 ppq is desirable. This .0013 ppq figure
means, approximately speaking, that one out of every ten million individuals faces an
excess risk of cancer exposure as a result of the water s dioxin content. Thus, a 1.2 ppq
standard would mean that, according to EPA s assessment, roughly one out of every
ten thousand individuals would face such exposure.
Id. at 1398 n.3.
61. Professor Adler also demonstrates that water criteria fail to address some sources of
impairment. He notes, for example, that water quality criteria have historically focused on
pollutant concentrations in water columns, ignoring the manner in which pollutants become
embedded in sediment, posing risks to bottom-dwelling organisms, or pass through the food
chain through processes of bioconcentration, biomagnification, and bioaccumulation. See Adler,
supra note 2, at 212.
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next.62 In some cases, the complexity of these decisions and
judgments led many a permit writer, and perhaps a water quality
analyst, to avoid making them altogether. 63 These problems have
been limited to some extent by EPA regulations requiring permit
writers to use specific methods to translate narrative criteria into
enforceable effluent limitations;64 however, similar constraints do not
apply to water quality monitoring.
The problems associated with the absence of quantitative criteria
are likely to be serious in the case of nutrients (principally nitrogen
and phosphorous) and pathogens, which are principal pollutants
associated with agricultural nonpoint source water quality
impairments.65 Until very recently, the EPA had issued no guidelines
on water criteria for nutrients.66 Currently though, it is expanding
guidance on criteria for pathogens to include more contaminants.67
62. On the variability of outcomes based on best professional judgment, see Stewart,
supra note 2, at 56 (best professional judgment allowed EPA and state regulators to exercise
great flexibility and ease the phase-in of more stringent controls, contrary to the statutory
scheme ). Similarly, Professor Latin has concluded:
Congress wanted technology-based standards to apply uniformly to similar sources
across the nation, but the permits were negotiated on an individualized basis
incorporating whichever control measures and compliance schedules dischargers
would accept. EPA characterized these permits as grounded on best professional
judgment; but they often reflected simply the best deal the Agency could obtain in
light of manpower and time constraints and its desire to demonstrate progress. These
best professional judgments were usually made by EPA regional personnel with
water quality, not technology-based orientations.
Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 21
ENVTL. L. 1647, 1672 (1991).
63. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing
WILLIAM RODGERS, 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 283-84 (1986)); see Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v.
EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ( Faced with th[e] conundrum [of translating
narrative criteria into permit limitations], some permit writers threw up their hands and,
contrary to the Act, simply ignored water quality standards including narrative criteria
altogether when deciding upon permit limitations. ).
64. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1)(vi) (2001); American Paper Inst., supra note 56
(upholding regulations).
65. See Memorandum from Geoffrey Grubbs to Regional Water Directors, Development
and Adoption of Nutrient Criteria into Water Quality Standards, at 2 (Nov. 14, 2001), available
at http://www.epa.gov/ost/standards/nutrient.html (nutrients); EPA, Developing Strategy for
Microbial Waterborne Disease, at 3 (Discussion Draft, Aug. 29, 2001), at http://www.epa.gov/
ost/humanhealth/microbial/microbial.html [hereinafter Discussion Draft].
66. See Nutrient Criteria Development; Notice of Ecoregional Nutrient Criteria, 66 Fed.
Reg. 1671 (Jan. 9, 2001).
67. See Discussion Draft, supra note 65.
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Few states have developed water quality criteria for nutrients, and
those that have rely on narrative standards.68
Problems of the same sort apply to assessments of wetlands. The
EPA proposed guidelines for water quality standards for wetlands in
1990,69 but only eleven states have designated uses for wetlands in
their water quality standards and only three states used monitoring
data to determine whether uses were being supported.70
It is not simply weak scientific understanding that leads to
inconsistent judgments. Natural Resources Defense Council also
illustrates that there is room for considerable disagreement between
EPA and the states, and among the states, on judgments about the
acceptable level of risk to those who wish to engage in designated
uses of waters. In Natural Resources Defense Council, the
inconsistency between the EPA s guidelines and the states criteria
was not attributable simply to differences in views about how much
dioxin can be tolerated to keep risks within an agreed-upon range.
The EPA s guidance for dioxin was based on a judgment that an
acceptable individual risk of contracting cancer from waterborne
dioxin is 1 in 10 million. By contrast, the states deemed a much
higher individual risk of 1 in 10,000 to be sufficient to protect human
health.71 Disparities in judgments of this sort make it difficult to
make reasonable conclusions about whether a particular water body
is or is not impaired, or whether the water body is safe for its
designated uses. These disparities are also likely to make it politically
and legally difficult to defend regulatory controls designed to meet
water quality criteria, particularly when the costs of such controls
become very high and the benefits are often difficult to establish in
concrete terms.72
While the dioxin criteria in Natural Resources Defense Council
may be a rather extreme illustration of disparities in scientific and
68. EPA, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL NUTRIENT
CRITERIA 2 (June 1998), at http://www.epa.gov/ost/standards/nutrient.html (last visited Apr. 21,
2002).
69. NATIONAL GUIDANCE, supra note 57.
70. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 147.
71. See supra note 70.
72. See HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 137 (noting that scientific
uncertainty supports resistance on part of regulated community).
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policy judgments about appropriate regulatory targets, it is by no
means an isolated example.73 These inconsistencies can lead to
serious problems in assessing water quality conditions, and more
severe problems where consistency across states is important for
example, in interstate waters or interconnected aquatic ecosystems.
Variable standards may lead to the conclusion by one state that
further regulation is necessary and required under the CWA to
achieve water quality goals in a particular river segment, while
another state, across the river, may conclude that the same segment is
currently supporting designated uses. Wendy Wagner nicely
summarizes these difficulties:
[W]e know so little about aquatic ecology and the effects of
the hundreds of manmade pollutants on our rivers and streams
[that] setting water quality standards . . . involves making
unverifiable approximations. These scientific uncertainties, in
fact, result in state-specific standards and goals that are quite
variable and hence particularly misguided with respect to
interstate waters.74
The final element of water quality standards, an antidegradation
policy, also raises particular difficulties for nonpoint source pollution
and determinations about whether water quality is impaired.75 The
antidegradation policy adopts a three-tier approach.76 In the first tier,
existing uses and water quality to support them must be maintained.77
In the second tier, waters of higher quality than the minimum
fishable/swimmable standards may not be allowed to degrade to
the fishable/swimmable level absent a showing that such degradation
is necessary for important social or economic reasons or cannot be
avoided even with the most stringent legal requirements on point
sources and best management practices on nonpoint sources.78 Tier
73. See Adler, supra note 2, at 251.
74. Wagner, supra note 58, at 438-39.
75. See generally John Harleston, What is Antidegradation Policy: Does Anyone Know?,
5 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 33 (1996); Adler, supra note 2, at 213-15, 223-25.
76. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a) (2001). See generally David S. Baron, Water Quality Standards
for Rivers and Lakes: Emerging Issues, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 559, 576-77 (1995).
77. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(1).
78. Id. § 131.12(a)(2).
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three requires that certain designated waters of high quality
outstanding national resource waters be protected and
maintained.79 Many states have not applied the antidegradation policy
to nonpoint source pollution.80 For these states, increases in nonpoint
source pollution that impair existing uses would not be considered to
violate state water quality standards or the antidegradation policy, so
long as designated uses are fully supported. By contrast, if existing
uses were impaired by increased point source pollution, the
antidegradation policy would be violated and the waterbody would be
deemed to be impaired.81
Establishing workable water quality standards and criteria, while
critical, is but one step in the process of developing an effective
pollution control policy. Effective monitoring should also provide
information about the sources of water quality problems. The
techniques to make such determinations are fraught with uncertainty,
particularly with respect to nonpoint sources. Monitoring to support
nonpoint-source-pollution control requires a more comprehensive
understanding of natural systems and the impacts of human activities,
such as agriculture or urban land uses, on natural systems 82 an
understanding that we currently lack. While there are several possible
models employed for these purposes, basic understanding of the fate
and transport in waters of particular pollutants is often quite thin.83
Accordingly, a pressing need exists in water quality management
programs for techniques to bridge the gaps in the knowledge base so
that appropriate judgments about the design of control programs can
be made.84
79. Id. § 131.12(a)(3).
80. See, e.g., Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001) (upholding
EPA s approval of Montana s water quality standards, which exempt nonpoint sources from
review under antidegradation policy).
81. See TMDL Rule, supra note 16, at 43607.
82. FINAL REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL TASK FORCE ON MONITORING WATER
QUALITY, THE STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING WATER-QUALITY MONITORING IN THE UNITED
STATES (1995), at http://water.usgs.gov/wicp/Summary.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002).
83. See ASSESSING THE TMDL APPROACH, supra note 16, at 29; Adler, supra note 2, at
222 & n.119; Boyd, supra note 11, at 72-73.
84. See Wagner, supra note 58, at 433-42. Professor Wagner concludes that the ultimate
enforceable requirements of the TMDL program are built on a house of cards: a series of
difficult and often impossible calculations that make the final requirement additional
quantitative limits on specific problematic dischargers scientifically indefensible. Id. at 440.
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A final problem in water quality assessment is again related to the
current regulatory structure. That structure has created mixed
incentives for the states in reporting on the quality of their waters.
Until very recently, states often had strong incentives in the face of
uncertainty to conclude that certain waters were impaired by
nonpoint source pollution. The section 319 program, discussed in
detail below, offers federal funding for states to devise and
implement nonpoint source pollution control programs for certain
impaired waters. Enticed by federal funding, many state agencies
may have been tempted to list waters as impaired in order to enhance
their budgets. The Governor of Wyoming noted these incentives in
testimony to Congress:
A few years ago, the authority for states to receive federal
money for watershed work required that we declare that a
waterbody was functionally impaired regardless of its actual
condition. That misunderstood incentive caused many streams
to be mislabeled as impaired. As a result Wyoming was able to
draw down section 319 money.85
Recently, however, the resurrection of the TMDL program, also
discussed below, may have reversed those incentives, for listing
waters as impaired for this program gives rise to significant
regulatory responsibilities. The state of Wyoming reduced the
number of its waters considered impaired from over 400 to 61, with
315 viewed as incapable of being characterized due to the absence of
sufficient data.86
More optimistically, The National Research Council recently concluded:
[T]he data and science have progressed sufficiently over the past 35 years to support
the nation s return to ambient-based water quality management. Given reasonable
expectations for data availability and the inevitable limits on our conceptual
understanding of complex systems, statements about the science behind water quality
management must be made with acknowledgment of uncertainties. The committee has
concluded that there are creative ways to accommodate this uncertainty while moving
forward in addressing the nation s water quality challenges.
ASSESSING THE TMDL APPROACH, supra note 16, at 3.
85. Hearing on Governors Perspectives on the Clean Water Act Before the Subcomm. On
Water Resources and Env t of the House Comm. On Transportation and Infrastructure, 106
Cong. 4 (1999), quoted in HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 139.
86. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 138.
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B. A Water Quality Snapshot
Within the limits of existing data, and with the foregoing caveats,
a troubling picture emerges of the extent of water quality
impairments throughout the nation and the sources that are
contributing to those impairments. Of the waters assessed for 1998,
thirty-five percent of river, forty-five percent of lake, and forty-four
percent of estuarine waters are considered impaired because the
waters do not fully support one or more of the uses protected by
applicable water quality standards.87 An additional, significant
percentage of waters is considered threatened, a term that state
officials use to express concern that a given water segment is in
jeopardy of not supporting designated uses because of trends in
pollution or land uses that threaten water quality.88 In nine states all
of the rivers and streams would be considered impaired, if statewide
fish consumption advisories for mercury contamination are
included.89
The costs of these impairments are undoubtedly very large, but
nearly unknown.90 While the Cayuhoga River is no longer burning,91
it has been estimated that nine hundred thousand people are getting
sick from the water they drink.92 Over seven thousand beach closings
were reported in 1998, and a third of shellfish beds are closed to
87. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at ES-3.
88. Id. at 53. Figures on the percentage of rivers considered threatened are set forth at id.
at 58 (10%); for lakes, see id. at 84 (9%); and for estuaries, see id. at 104 (9%).
89. Id. at 58. The states are Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Vermont.
90. In quantified terms, it has been estimated that the annual costs imposed by sediment
from agricultural erosion may be as high as $8 billion, and include costs to navigation,
recreational activities, water treatment, and water use systems. See RIBAUDO, ECONOMICS OF
WATER QUALITY PROTECTION, supra note 18, at 7. EPA has estimated that the annual costs to
treat drinking water due to nitrate contamination is $200 million. See id. at 11. Damages to
agriculture, households, utilities, and industry caused by salinity in the Colorado River alone
may exceed $800 million. Id. at 15. Health costs due to waterborne pathogens are also
significant. Id. For a summary of the costs associated with water pollution and the benefits of
water pollution control, see id. at 16.
91. See Caputo, supra note 2.
92. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, POLLUTION PARALYSIS II: CODE RED FOR
WATERSHEDS 4 (2000), at http://www.nwf.org/watershed/paralysis/pp2_report.pdf (last visited
Apr. 21, 2002) [hereinafter POLLUTION PARALYSIS].
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harvesting.93 States issue thousands of fish consumption advisories
annually, affecting almost every state.94 Problems of various kinds
have also plagued virtually all parts of the country: in the South, a
dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico, caused in part from pollutants
originating as far away as the upper Midwest, is now the size of New
Jersey;95 along the Eastern Seaboard, a cell from hell contaminated
rivers linked to the Chesapeake Bay, causing massive fish kills in
1997;96 in the West, fish and wildlife habitats are disappearing due to
water diversion and uses;97 ninety-seven percent of the Great Lakes
shoreline miles were subject to fish consumption advisories;98 in
Milwaukee, cryptosporidium contamination made 370,000 people
sick and may have killed 100;99 and both on the Atlantic seaboard
and in the Midwest, water contaminated by animal waste has killed
thousands of fish.100 There is also growing concern that some
pesticides so-called persistent organic pollutants or POPs are
disrupting the endocrine systems of aquatic species, wildlife, and
humans, causing among other things significant threats to
reproductive health.101 Clearly, improvements in water quality are, or
should be, a significant national priority.
93. Id.
94. CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 10.
95. POLLUTION PARALYSIS, supra note 92, at 4.
96. Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351,
396-99 (2000); William J. Broad, Battling the cell from Hell; research on Pfiesteria piscida, 35
NAT L WILDLIFE 10 (Aug. 18, 1997); Elaine Bueschen, Pfiesteria Piscicida: A Regional
Symptom of a National Problem, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. 10317 (June 1998).
97. See Baron, supra note 54, at 588.
98. POLLUTION PARALYSIS, supra note 92, at 3-4.
99. See Baron, supra note 54, at 560.
100. See NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, CESSPOOLS OF SHAME: HOW
FACTORY FARM LAGOONS AND SPRAYFIELDS THREATEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC
HEALTH 36 (2001), at http://www.nrdc.org/water/pollution/cesspools/cesspools.pdf (last visited
Apr. 21, 2002) [hereinafter CESSPOOLS OF SHAME].
101. See THEO COLBORN, DIANNE DUMANOSKI, AND JOHN PETERSON MYERS, OUR
STOLEN FUTURE: ARE WE THREATENING OUR FERTILITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND SURVIVAL? A
SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY (1996); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, HORMONALLY ACTIVE
AGENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENT (1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/
0309064198/html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002); Noah Sachs, Blocked Pathways: Potential Legal
Responses to Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289 (1999).
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C. The Link Between Impaired Water Quality and Agriculture
The impairments discussed above are associated with a number of
pollution problems caused by a variety of sources. Significantly,
nonpoint source pollution is the culprit in most cases.102 Agriculture s
role in nonpoint source pollution is, in turn, also quite large.103 The
states reported that in 1998 agricultural pollution was considered
primarily responsible for fifty-nine percent of impaired river miles,104
thirty-one percent of impaired lakes,105 and fifteen percent of
impaired estuarine waters.106 Anecdotal evidence confirms a strong
relation between agriculture and water quality. A 1995 report by the
now-defunct Office of Technology Assessment noted that 71
percent of U.S. cropland remains in watersheds where at least one
agricultural pollutant exceeds standards for recreation or ecological
health. 107 The extent of agriculture s contribution to extant water
quality problems should not be surprising. There are over 1.9 million
farms in the American landscape covering 930 million acres108
nearly half of all the land in the nation.109
Agricultural nonpoint pollution can contaminate surface waters as
pollutants are carried in runoff and through the air and ultimately
settle in surface waters and groundwater.110 In addition, some sources
of water pollution are treated as nonpoint sources simply because
they are excluded from the CWA s definition of a point source, not
because the point at which the pollutants are discharged is
unidentifiable.111 An example is certain irrigation return flows from
102. See text accompanying supra note 3.
103. See Ruhl, supra note 5, at 287-91; PAUL FAETH, FERTILE GROUND: NUTRIENT
TRADING S POTENTIAL TO COST-EFFECTIVELY IMPROVE WATER QUALITY 5 (2000), available
at http://www.wri.org/water/nutrient.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002) ( The principal cause of
surface water impairment is agriculture . . . . ) [hereinafter FERTILE GROUND].
104. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 62.
105. Id. at 88.
106. Id. at 108.
107. TARGETING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES, supra note 6, at 11.
108. Ruhl, supra note 5, at 272.
109. See AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 58, at 69.
110. See generally PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 58, at 752.
111. See Nat l Wildlife Fed n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (The
nonpoint source category is defined by exclusion and includes all water quality problems not
regulated as point sources under the CWA.). EPA defines nonpoint source water pollution as
water pollution caused by rainfall or snowmelt moving over and through the ground and
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agricultural operations.112
The varieties of pollutants associated with, and agricultural
practices implicated in, nonpoint source pollution are numerous, and
pose very different kinds of threats to water quality, and as a
consequence, to aquatic life, wildlife, and human health. The leading
categories of agricultural activities that impair water quality are nonirrigated crop production, irrigated crop production, and concentrated
animal feeding operations.113 The most widespread agricultural
pollutants are sediment, nutrients, bacteria, and toxic organic
chemicals.114
Tilling and cultivating soil increases soil erosion. Wind and runoff
carrying natural and human-made pollutants into lakes, rivers, streams, wetlands, estuaries,
coastal waters, and ground water. Environmental Protection Agency, Section 319 Consistency
Guidance, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,504 (1998). Elsewhere, EPA has emphasized that many nonpoint
source water pollutants enter water bodies through atmospheric deposition. 1998 WATER
QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 248. The CWA, while not defining nonpoint source water
pollution directly, does provide what may be regarded as an illustrative list of nonpoint sources
in 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f), which provides:
[EPA], after consultation with appropriate Federal and State agencies and other
interested persons, shall issue to [various agencies], within one year after [Oct. 18,
1972] (and from time to time thereafter) information including (1) guidelines for
identifying and evaluating the nature and extent of nonpoint sources of pollutants, and
(2) processes, procedures, and methods to control pollution resulting from
(A) agricultural and silvicultural activities, including runoff from fields and crop and
forest lands;
(B) mining activities, including runoff and siltation from new, currently operating, and
abandoned surface and underground mines;
(C) all construction activity, including runoff from the facilities resulting from such
construction;
(D) the disposal of pollutants in wells or in subsurface excavations;
(E) salt water intrusion resulting from reductions of fresh water flow from any cause,
including extraction of ground water, irrigation, obstruction, and diversion; and
(F) changes in the movement, flow, or circulation of any navigable waters or ground
waters, including changes caused by the construction of dams, levees, channels,
causeways, or flow diversion facilities.
33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2) (2001).
112. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (excluding these sources from the definition of a point
source).
113. Claudia Copeland, Water Quality Initiatives and Agriculture, Cong. Research Rep.
No. RL30437, at 5 (Feb. 16, 2000), available at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/
water/h2p-38.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
114. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at ES-3, 18-21.
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carry soil particles, often contaminated with pesticides and other
pollutants, to surface waters (sheet and rill erosion). The effects from
these sediments, or siltation, include blockage of streams, destruction
of wetlands and habitat for aquatic life, disruption of water treatment
facilities, and increased frequency and severity of floods. While rates
of erosion have decreased significantly over the years, in 1997, soil
loss from water erosion was still very high in absolute terms: 1.14
billion tons, or a rate of 6.4 tons per acre.115 Sediments from soil
erosion are estimated to impose costs as high as eight billion dollars
annually.116 In a 1997 report to Congress, EPA concluded that:
(1) Sediment contamination affects every region and state of
the country; overall 96 watersheds are a source of probable
concern and two-thirds of these watersheds have fish
consumption advisories in place;
(2) Streams, lakes, harbors, nearshore areas, and oceans are all
affected by sediment contaminated with PCBs, mercury,
organochlorine pesticides, and polyaromatic hydrocarbons; and
(3) As much as 10% of the sediment underlying U.S. surface
waters is contaminated with toxic pollutants that pose potential
risks to fish and to humans and wildlife who eat fish.
Polluted agriculture runoff continues to release other chemicals to
surface waters which then accumulate to harmful levels in sediment.
Many of the contaminants can persist for many years in the sediment,
raising continuing concerns for the environment.117
Vast quantities of nutrients from excess fertilizers and animal
wastes, particularly phosphorous and nitrogen, are deposited into
waters, some in sediment loads. These pollutants accelerate the
process of eutrophication, which in turn causes several problems,
115. USDA, Natural Resources Conservation Service, Cropland Acreage, Soil Erosion,
and Installation of Conservation Buffer Strips: Preliminary Estimates of the 1997 National
Resources Inventory, at http://www.nhq.nrcs.usda.gov/land/pubs/buffer1.html (last visited Mar.
22, 2002). For maps estimating the amount of sediment delivered to streams and rivers from
agricultural operations, see http://www.nhq.nrcs.usda.gov/land/meta/m2087.html (last visited
Mar. 22, 2002).
116. RIBAUDO, ECONOMICS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION, supra note 18, at 7.
117. See EPA, Contaminated Sediment: EPA s Report to Congress, at http://www.epa.gov/
waterscience/cs/consed.html (last visited Oct. 27, 1998).
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including: increased algal growth; decreased water clarity and
transparency; foul taste and odor; increased water treatment costs;
depletion of dissolved oxygen; fish kills; and loss of desirable fish
species.118 Nitrate contamination in water supplies may also cause
blue-baby syndrome, a disease that can be fatal to infants.119 In
addition, excess nutrients may contribute to toxic algal blooms that
can cause massive fish kills, threaten commercial fisheries, and harm
other aquatic life forms. Red tides, as well as Pfiesteria, which
killed as many as a billion fish in 1991 and ten million menhaden fish
in the Neuse River in 1995,120 pose an increasingly frequent
recurring problem for U.S. coastal communities. 121 Over zealous
farmers through excess fertilization cause as much as thirty-nine
percent of all nitrogen loads and thirty percent of phosphorous loads
in surface waters.122
Similarly, animal manure contributes significant quantities of
nutrients and bacteria to rivers, lakes, and streams.123 This is a
problem of increasing concern, because animal feeding operations are
becoming larger and more concentrated, placing considerable stress
on nearby water resources.124 The General Accounting Office
reported that [n]ationwide, about 130 times more animal waste is
produced than human waste roughly 5 tons for every U.S. citizen
and some operations with hundreds of thousands of animals produce
as much waste as a town or a city. 125 Inadequate waste
management such as applying manure as fertilizer on frozen
winter fields or in quantities far in excess of actual need; and use of
118. See FERTILE GROUND, supra note 103, at 6.
119. See Donald L. Hey, Nitrogen Farming: Harvesting a Different Crop, 4 WETLAND
MATTERS (Nov. 1999), at http://www.wetlands-initiative.org/pages/page80.html.
120. See POLLUTION PARALYSIS, supra note 92, at 5; see also EPA and USDA, Unified
National Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations, at § 2.2 (Mar. 9, 1999), at
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/finafost.htm [hereinafter Unified National Strategy].
121. 1998 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 130.
122. See FERTILE GROUND, supra note 108, at 7.
123. Id. at 9.
124. See Unified National Strategy, at § 2.1 ; RIBAUDO, ECONOMICS OF WATER QUALITY
PROTECTION, supra note 18, at 10; see also Ken Silverstein, Meat Factories, SIERRA (Jan.
1999), at http://www.sierraclub.org/sieria/199901/cafo.asp.
125. General Accounting Office, Animal Agriculture: Waste Management Practices,
GAO/RCED 99-205, at 1 (July 1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/ 1999/rc99205.
pdf.
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poorly constructed or poorly maintained waste containment
facilities result in spills, leaks, and runoff of these wastes often in
very large quantities.126
These and other pollutants, their associated agricultural activities,
and their impacts on water quality are summarized in the following
table:
Agricultural impacts on water quality127
Agricultural
Activity
Tillage/
ploughing
Fertilizing

Manure Spreading

Pesticides

Impacts on Surface Water Quality
Sediment/turbidity: Sediments carry phosphorus
and pesticides adsorbed to sediment particles;
siltation of river beds and loss of habitat,
spawning ground, etc.
Runoff of nutrients, especially phosphorus,
leading to eutrophication causing taste and odor
in public water supply, excess algae growth
leading to deoxygenation of water and fish kills.
Carried out as a fertilizer activity; spreading on
frozen ground results in high levels of
contamination of receiving waters by pathogens,
metals, phosphorus and nitrogen leading to
eutrophication and potential contamination.
Runoff of pesticides leads to contamination of
surface water and biota; dysfunction of ecological
system in surface waters by loss of top predators
due to growth inhibition and reproductive failure;
public health impacts from eating contaminated
fish. Pesticides are carried as dust by wind over
very long distances and contaminate aquatic
systems
1000s
of
miles
away
(e.g.
tropical/subtropical pesticides found in Arctic
mammals).

126. Id.; CESSPOOLS OF SHAME, supra note 100, at 3-4.
127. Table adapted from FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, CONTROL OF WATER
POLLUTION FROM AGRICULTURE, Table 5 (1996), at http://www.fao.org/docrep/W2598E/
w2598e04.htm#agricultural_impacts_on_water_quality (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
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Agricultural
Activity
Feedlots/
animal
corrals
Irrigation
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Impacts on Surface Water Quality
Contamination of surface water with many
pathogens (bacteria, viruses, etc.) leading to
chronic
public
health
problems.
Also
contamination by metals contained in urine and
feces.
Runoff of salts leading to salinization of surface
waters; runoff of fertilizers and pesticides to
surface waters with ecological damage,
bioaccumulation in edible fish species, etc. High
levels of trace elements such as selenium can
occur with serious ecological damage and
potential human health impacts.

II. THE CURRENT FEDERAL FRAMEWORK FOR AGRICULTURAL
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION
People have been cognizant for some time of the large impact that
agriculture has on water resources. A glut of federal programs
address, directly or indirectly, agricultural water pollution.128
Nonetheless, the aggressiveness with which federal agencies may
pursue efforts to control agricultural nonpoint source pollution is
significantly constrained by existing statutory authorities.
Agriculture, in a very real sense, has enjoyed a free ride in existing
water quality programs: there is virtually no direct regulatory controls
on agricultural practices that contribute to nonpoint source pollution
and the costs of those in place are largely underwritten by public
subsidies. This section provides an overview of existing federal
programs under the Clean Water Act. Programs administered by
128. A 1999 report by the General Accounting Office identified thirty-five federal
programs representing a broad array of activities, reflecting diversity in both the nature of
nonpoint source pollution and the remedies needed to address it. General Accounting Office,
Water Quality: Federal Role in Addressing and Contributing to Nonpoint Source Pollution,
Report No. GAO/RCED 99-45, at 25 (Feb. 1999) [hereinafter GAO Report 99-45]. Some of the
more prominent federal programs not discussed in this Article include the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA); the Endangered Species Act (ESA); the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA); and the Clean Air Act. For discussion of how these programs
may affect agricultural water pollution, see Ruhl, supra note 5, at 305-09 (Clean Air Act), 30912 (FIFRA), 321-23 (ESA); GAO Report 99-45, supra, at 30-31 (SDWA).
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other federal agencies, most prominently the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), are described in a more summary manner.
A. Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs for Point Sources
The Clean Water Act authorizes a number of programs that
address or have effects on agricultural water pollution. These
programs include: the section 402 National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES);129 the section 404 Dredged and Fill
Material Permit Program (section 404 program);130 a number of
planning requirements and grant programs, including the section 303
TMDL program and the section 319 Nonpoint Source Control
Program;131 and a few regional programs.132
The first two programs, the NPDES and section 404 permitting
programs, are the major regulatory programs in the CWA, and both
are limited to controlling discharges from point sources. The
remaining programs do not authorize direct federal regulation of
nonpoint sources, but rely instead on incentives to induce the states to
implement programs designed to control nonpoint source pollution.
The absence of direct federal controls on nonpoint source
pollution in the CWA has, until very recently, had the effect of
deemphasizing the water quality objectives of the CWA in favor of
the relatively less complex and administratively more feasible
objective of implementing technology-based standards for point
sources.133 To be sure, the CWA includes provisions for imposing
more stringent, enforceable limitations on point sources if the
technology-based standards prove insufficient to meet water quality
129. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2001).
130. Id. § 1344.
131. Id. §§ 1313(d), 1329.
132. The regional programs address the Chesapeake Bay, the Great Lakes, Long Island
Sound, and Lake Champlain. For a good overview of these programs, see Robert Adler,
Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 1070-77 (1995) [hereinafter
Alder, Watershed Protection]. Professor Adler also discusses several other CWA programs,
including the Clean Lakes and Estuary programs. Id. at 1077-79.
133. See generally WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1986); Adler,
Watershed Protection, supra note 132, at 1038 (1995); James Boyd, The New Face of the Clean
Water Act: A Critical Review of the EPA s New TMDL Rules, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL Y F.
39 (2000); Caputo, supra note 2.
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standards.134 But the larger task of ensuring an ambient water quality
that minimally satisfies the CWA s ambition for fishable and
swimmable waters is relegated to a complex and confusing array of
planning requirements that have yielded few enforceable controls.135
1. The NPDES Program and Agricultural Pollution
Section 402 of the CWA establishes the NPDES, a nationwide
permitting program applicable to all point sources of water
pollution.136 The CWA defines a point source as any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or
may be discharged. 137 While this language may be interpreted to
include agricultural practices that are sometimes viewed as
contributors to nonpoint source pollution,138 most agricultural
practices have escaped the NPDES program s regulatory net. In part,
this is due to the nature of much agricultural pollution it is difficult
to characterize as discharges from a discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance and, more expansively, to the express
exclusion of agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows
from irrigated agriculture from the CWA s definition of a point
source.139
134. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C); 1312(b)(2)(A); 1313(d); 1314(l).
135. See Adler, Integrated Approaches, supra note 2, at 215-16 (describing water quality
provisions of the CWA as a series of somewhat confusing, overlapping planning and
implementation requirements spread throughout various sections and subsections of the Act ).
136. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).
137. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
138. See Concerned Area Residents for the Env t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that manure spreading operations of a dairy farm constitute a point source for
purposes of CWA). The decision in this case caused an outcry from the agricultural community,
who regarded the activities as nonpoint source pollution immune from CWA regulation. The
House of Representatives passed legislation to overrule the decision, but the provision was
never enacted as law. See Ruth A. Moore, Controlling Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution:
The New York Experience, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 103, 115-18 (1997).
139. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). These exclusions from the definition of a point source were
added by Congress in 1977, effectively overruling the decision in NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d
1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977), in which the court rejected EPA s attempt to exempt discharges of these
sorts from the CWA s permit requirements. Congress also inserted the exclusion for irrigation
return flows in section 402 the NPDES provisions providing: [EPA] shall not require a
permit under this section for discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated
agriculture, nor shall [EPA] directly or indirectly, require any State to require such a permit.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(l). On these exclusions, see Ruhl, supra note 5, at 294-96.
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Permits for discharges from point sources must include
categorical, technology-based effluent limitations established by the
EPA140 or, where the EPA has not promulgated such limitations,
control requirements based on the permit writer s best professional
judgment about what cleanup technologies individual sources can
implement.141 In addition, point sources may be subject to more
stringent control requirements if necessary to meet ambient water
quality standards.142
States may administer an EPA-approved permit program within
their respective jurisdictions in place of the EPA-administered
NPDES program. These programs are often described as State
Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems (SPDES).143
A major category of agricultural sources that has a significant
impact on water quality is animal feeding operations (AFOs). The
industry is very large, accounting for half of all sales in U.S.
agriculture.144 The variety of facilities that can properly be considered
AFOs is quite diverse, including livestock farms, feedlots, pens,
corrals, roundup areas, wintering operations, dairies, stockyards,
auctions houses, poultry operations, stables, racetracks, fairs, and
rodeos.145 Some very large AFOs are subject to direct regulation
140. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b); see E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112
(1977).
141. Mark C. Van Putten & Bradley D. Jackson, The Dilution of the Clean Water Act, 19
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 863, 882 (1986); see 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (permits issued prior to
the taking of necessary implementing actions must include such conditions as [EPA]
determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of [the CWA] ).
142. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
143. See id. § 1342(b)-(c), (n) (full and partial state programs). EPA retains important
oversight functions. See id. § 1342(c)-(d). For a list of states with approved NPDES programs,
see http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm?program_id=12 (last modified Mar. 20, 2001).
144. EPA & USDA, Unified National Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations, 63 Fed.
Reg. 50192, 50193 n.1 (Sept. 21, 1998) [hereinafter Unified National Strategy]. This document
is a draft version of the Unified National Strategy, supra note 120, that the agencies submitted
for public comment.
145. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 15, at 2960, 3005.
An AFO is a facility where animals are stabled or confined and fed or maintained for a total of
45 days or more in any 12-month period ; (ii) Crops, vegetation forage growth, or post-harvest
residues are not sustained in the normal growing season over any portion of the lot or facility.
40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1)(ii) (2001). Cases have addressed this definition and concluded that the
second criterion that crops are not sustained over any portion of the facility does not exclude
from the definition of an AFO farms where crops are grown on fields adjacent to feedlots; thus,
[t]he vegetation criterion applies to the lot or facility in which the animals are confined.
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under the CWA s NPDES program as concentrated animal feeding
operations (CAFOs).146 Technically, CAFOs are not nonpoint
sources because they are expressly included in the CWA s definition
of point sources.147
Until recently, CAFOs have received little federal or state
regulatory attention.148 Under current regulations, AFOs are not
considered CAFOs and thus point sources subject to NPDES
permits and effluent limitations unless they meet restrictive
regulatory criteria based on a three-tier approach. Subject to
important exceptions, facilities that confine more than 1000 animal
units, facilities that confine between 300 and 1000 animal units and
meet certain additional criteria, and facilities determined on a caseby-case basis to contribute significantly to water pollution, are
CAFOs.149 The technology-based effluent limitation for CAFOs
Concerned Area Residents for the Env t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 1994).
EPA has proposed to clarify the definition of an AFO in new CAFO regulations. The proposal
provides:
An animal feeding operation or AFO is a facility where animals (other than aquatic
animals) have been, are, or will be stabled or confined and fed or maintained for a total
of 45 days or more in any 12-month period. Animals are not considered to be stabled
or confined when they are in areas such as pastures or rangeland that sustain crops or
forage growth during the entire time that animals are present. Animal feeding
operations include both the production area and land application area . . . .
Id.
146. See Copeland, supra note 113. According to EPA and USDA:
Approximately 450,000 agricultural operations nationwide confine animals. (2) USDA
data indicate that the vast majority of farms with livestock are small. About 85% of
these farms have fewer than 250 animal units (AUs).(3) This data comes from an
analysis of the 1992 Agricultural Census. An AU is equal to roughly one beef cow,
therefore 1,000 AUs is equal to 1,000 beef cows or equivalent number of other
animals. Of these, in 1992 about 6,600 had more than 1,000 AUs and are considered to
be large operations.
Unified National Strategy, supra note 120, at § 2.1.
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
148. See generally LOCATING LIVESTOCK, infra note 152, at 6-7.
149. An animal feeding operation may be a point source if it meets the definition of a
concentrated animal feeding operation. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(a). That definition lists the
following criteria: (1) the facility confines more than 1000 animal units, or (2) the facility
confines more than 300 animal units and either pollutants are discharged into navigable waters
through a manmade ditch, flushing system or other similar man-made device; or pollutants are
discharged directly into waters of the United States which originate outside of and pass over,
across, or through the facility or otherwise come into direct contact with the animals confined in
the operation. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23, Appendix B. An animal unit is a benchmark used to
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mandates that permits specify a no discharge to surface waters
limitation, with an exception for discharges during extreme storm
events.150
A large number of AFOs falling within the criteria for CAFOs
have nonetheless escaped regulation. A Congressional Research
Service Report states that less than thirty percent of AFOs meeting
the size requirements in the EPA s definition of a CAFO or roughly
2,000 out of 6,000 had permits as of February, 2000.151 Another
report provides a much higher estimate as many as 18,000 of the
number of CAFOs that should have permits, but do not.152 The report
also notes that in roughly half the states, no CAFOs have NPDES
permits. 153 Moreover, the EPA reported that of the permits that had
been issued, only 760 were current at the end of 1995.154
The low rates at which AFOs are included in the NPDES program
is, in part, due to EPA s definition of a CAFO, which excludes any
AFO that does not discharge pollutants except in the event of a 25year, 24-hour storm event. 155 Additional reasons for the relatively
low rate of coverage by the NPDES program include: an historical
tendency of regulators to focus on urban rather than rural water
quality, ignoring AFOs in favor of large municipal and industrial
equalize the waste characteristics of various kinds of animals. Excluded from CAFO status are
animal feeding operations that discharge[] only in the event of a 25 year, 24-hour storm
event. Id. Animal feeding operations that do not meet the CAFO criteria may nonetheless be
treated as a CAFO subject to the NPDES program if, on a case-by-case basis, it is determined
that the facility is a significant contributor of pollution to the waters of the United States. 40
C.F.R. § 122.23(c).
150. Feedlots Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R. § 412 (1999) (effluent limitations on
feedlots).
151. Copeland, supra note 113, at 8.
152. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, LOCATING LIVESTOCK: HOW WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL EFFORTS CAN USE INFORMATION FROM STATE REGULATORY PROGRAMS 6 (June
1999), available at http://www.eli-org/pdf/rreafo99.pdf [hereinafter LOCATING LIVESTOCK].
153. Id.
154. See Copeland, supra note 113, at 8 (citing Roberta Parry, Agricultural Phosphorous
and Water Quality: A U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Perspective, 27 J. ENVTL.
QUALITY 258 (1998)).
155. See supra note 149; Copeland, supra note 113, at 8 (noting that disputes between
regulators and agricultural operators over whether particular facilities meet the regulatory
threshold, such as whether the regulations apply to feedlots that claim to have no discharge is a
factor explaining low level of permitting); Water Keeper Alliance, Inc. v. Smithfield Foods,
Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21314, at 7-8 (E.D.N.C. 2001) (defendant unsuccessfully moved to
dismiss CWA citizen suit on grounds that it was not CAFO due to the 25-year storm exclusion).
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point sources; changes in waste management technology that have
rendered EPA s rules largely irrelevant; state programs that address
CAFOs outside the NPDES program; and difficulties in identifying
and locating these facilities.156 Even those CAFOs that operate under
NPDES permits traditionally have not been subject to restrictions on
practices that may have significant impacts on water quality such as
land application of manure and wastewater and are inspected for
compliance only after citizen complaints or accidental releases.157
Moreover, the NPDES program for CAFOs has largely proceeded on
the basis of general permits,158 which may be difficult to enforce and
which tend to make effective public participation difficult.159
In recent years, CAFOs have come under intense scrutiny, and
with good reason.160 Releases of wastes from these facilities in North
Carolina and Missouri have caused large fish kills.161 Manure
generated by these large animal factories is often spread over land
and may contribute substantial amounts of nutrients, sediment,
pathogens, heavy metals, hormones, antibiotics, and ammonia to
surface waters. Nutrient loadings of nitrogen and phosphorous from
AFOs are a major cause of water quality impairments.162 Animal
156. Copeland, supra note 113, at 8; LOCATING LIVESTOCK, supra note 152, at 6-7;
ANIMAL AGRICULTURE, supra note 125, at 61.
157. Id.; see RIBAUDO, ECONOMICS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION, supra note 18, at 11
(noting survey that in ten Midwest states few States actively inspect . . . [CAFOs] for
problems, including the integrity of storage structures and that wastes were leaking from half
of North Carolina s lagoons built before 1993 ).
158. In 2001, EPA estimated that seventy percent of permitted CAFOs were operating
under general permits. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 15, at
3042.
159. For a sample general permit for CAFOs, see National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System General Permit and Reporting Requirements for Discharges From Concentrated Animal
Feeding Operations, 58 Fed. Reg. 7610 (Feb. 8, 1993). On the potential problems of
enforcement of general permit terms, see Staci J. Pratt et al., A Comparison of US and UK Law
Regarding Pollution from Agricultural Runoff, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 159, 171-73 (1997). Many
states have also issued general permits for CAFOs under EPA s delegated authority to
administer the NPDES program within the state. For an example, and a general discussion of
general permits, see John H. Davidson, South Dakota Groundwater Protection Law, 40 S.D. L.
REV. 1, 60-61 (1995).
160. For a review of the water pollution contribution for which AFOs are responsible, see
ANIMAL AGRICULTURE, supra note 125, at 8-27.
161. See Bob Schildgen, Murphy s Laws: 1. Hogs Rule 2. You Pay; Environmental
Hazards of Hog Farms, 81 SIERRA 29 (May 1996), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/
sierra/199605/priorities.asp.
162. See ANIMAL AGRICULTURE, supra note 125, at 10; Danielle Nierenberg, Toxic
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manure is also suspected to have contributed to outbreaks of
Pfiesteria along the Mid-Atlantic seaboard and the tragic
cryptosporidium contamination in Milwaukee.163 The amount of
manure that may be generated and stored by these operations is
enormous. For example, in Concerned Area Residents for the
Environment v. Southview Farms,164 the court noted that the
defendant s dairy farm had five lagoons for storing manure, one of
which had a capacity of six to eight million gallons of liquid cow
manure.165 Even this pales in comparison to a waste lagoon in North
Carolina which, when breached in 1995, released twenty-five million
gallons of hog waste, killing nearly all aquatic life in a seventeenmile stretch of the New River.166 Citizens have become more
aggressive in their opposition to CAFOs. In fact, a number of citizen
suits have been initiated under the CWA in recent years, sometimes
meeting with success.167 One important strategy for bringing about
greater control of water pollution from these facilities is to promote
opportunities for greater citizen involvement and enforcement.168
As part of the Clinton Administration s Clean Water Action Plan,
the EPA and the USDA have jointly issued a Unified National
Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations (Unified National
Strategy).169 A major component of this initiative is an overhaul, and
strengthening, of the EPA s CAFO rules. The EPA concluded that
Fertility, 14:2 WORLD WATCH 30 (Mar. 1, 2001).
163. Unified National Strategy, supra note 120, at § 2.2.
164. 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994).
165. Id. at 116.
166. See Anita K. Chancey, Clean Water Act Compliance Audit Program for Pork
Producers : How was such an Agreement Reached Between EPA and the National Pork
Producers?, 7 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL Y REV. 62, 64 (2000).
167. See Concerned Area Residents for the Env t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir.
1994); Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1991); Water Keeper Alliance,
Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21314, at 7-8 (E.D.N.C. 2000); Idaho
Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Idaho 2001); Cmty. Ass n for Restoration of
the Env t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (E.D. Wash. 1999); American Canoe
Ass n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21402 (E.D. N.C. 1998); Weber v. Trinity
Meadows Raceway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15302 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
168. A significant issue concerns the tendency of new CAFOs to locate in areas where the
population is generally poor or of an overwhelmingly minority racial composition, raising
environmental justice issues. See Becky Gillette, Makin Bacon, E MAGAZINE, (June 1,
2000), at http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=9263.
169. Unified National Strategy, supra note 120.
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CAFO programs var[y] from state-to-state, as does the
implementation of NPDES programs for CAFOs, and that [a]s
animal production continues to become more industrialized
nationwide, a coherent and systematic approach to implementing
minimum standards is needed to ensure consistent protection of water
quality. 170 EPA proposed new CAFO regulations on January 12,
2001.171
The EPA s proposed rule attempts to ensure greater protection of
water quality from animal feeding operations in two basic ways.
First, the rule expands the number of AFOs that are subject to the
NPDES program. Second, the rule addresses the most significant
threats that AFOs pose to water quality discharges of manure and
wastewater from both poorly designed waste storage facilities and
from runoff from fields on which excessive amounts of these wastes
have been placed.
To expand the coverage of the NPDES to more AFOs, the EPA
proposed two alternatives to determine which AFOs are CAFOs, and
thus subject to regulation under the NPDES permitting program. The
first is a two-tier structure under which AFOs would be considered
CAFOs if they contain a threshold number of animal units (reduced
from the current threshold of 1,000 to 500) or are designated as
CAFOs on a case-by-case basis.172 The second alternative would
retain the existing three-tier approach, but include more stringent
conditions applicable to AFOs in the middle, 300-1000 animal unit
tier.173 In addition, the EPA proposed to eliminate the 25-year, 24hour storm exception, expressing concern that many AFOs claiming
the exception are improperly interpreting which discharges are the
result of 25-year 24-hour storms and chronic rainfall which may
result in breaches and overflows of storage systems, or ignoring
discharges from improper land application of manure and
wastewater. 174 The EPA estimated that the number of AFOs required
170. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 15, at 2970.
171. Id. at 2960. EPA s action was in part taken in response to a lawsuit, Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Reilly, No. 89-2980 (D.D.C.), which was settled by a consent
decree. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems, supra note 15, at 2962.
172. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems, supra note 15, at 2996-98.
173. Id. at 2999-3003.
174. Id. at 3006.
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to obtain permits would rise from 12,660 under the current
regulations to 25,540 under the two-tier proposal or 31,930 under the
revised three-tier proposal.175 The amount of all AFO-generated
manure that would be covered by these options was estimated by
EPA at sixty-four percent for the two-tier approach and seventy-two
percent for the three-tier approach.176
The rule strengthens effluent limitations governing CAFOs.
Among other things, certain CAFOs must assess whether there is a
hydrologic connection to surface waters from groundwater beneath
feedlots and manure storage areas. In addition, a zero discharge
limitation is imposed on certain CAFOs. Routine inspections of
production areas, requirements for handling dead animals, and better
monitoring and reporting requirements are also mandated.177
To address additional threats to water quality posed by discharges
of manure and AFO wastewater, the EPA expanded the definition of
AFOs and CAFOs to include not only the animal production area but
also land application areas, meaning any land to which a CAFO s
manure and wastewater is applied (e.g., crop fields, fields, pasture)
that is under the control of the CAFO owner or operator, whether
through ownership or a lease or contract. 178 The proposed rule also
clarifies that discharges of pollutants due to land application of
manure may be considered point source discharges subject to NPDES
regulation. The CWA s exclusion of agricultural stormwater
discharges 179 will apply to discharges associated with land
application of manure only if proper agricultural practices are
observed.180
Proper agricultural practices
governing land
application of manure or wastewater must be based on the nutrient
needs of crops as determined through periodic soil sampling.
Discharges from land where manure or wastewater are applied at
rates that exceed those calculated under prescribed methods would
175. Id. at 3003, tbls. 7-8.
176. Id. at 2987.
177. See EPA, Proposed Regulations to Address Water Pollution from Concentrated
Animal Feeding Operations 3 (Mar. 2001) [hereinafter CAFO Factsheet], available at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/afo/caforule.cfm?program_id=7.
178. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 15, at 3010.
179. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2001).
180. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 15, at 3029-32.
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fall outside the agricultural stormwater exemption.181
Land application restrictions would extend beyond CAFOs to
those who apply CAFO-generated manure and wastewaters to land,
as well as to AFOs that engage in such practices. Unless these
facilities observe proper agricultural practices, resulting discharges
would be considered point source discharges subject to NPDES
permits.182 For CAFOs, land application of manure and wastewater is
controlled by permit conditions requiring approved permit nutrient
plans, which prohibit manure or wastewater applications within one
hundred feet of surface waters and restrict applications to frozen,
snow-covered, or saturated grounds.183
EPA s proposal also attempts to account for changes in the
structure of the animal feeding operations industry, which have
tended to blur lines of responsibility for animal waste management.
Currently, many feedlot owners do not own the animals they raise.
Rather, they contract with meat processors who retain ownership of
the animals and often prescribe exacting conditions on how the
animals are to be raised and housed.184
As farmers become increasingly integrated into the agribusiness
food chain, they lose control over the totality of the production
process, therefore shifting more and more to the role of technology
applicators, as opposed to managers making informed and
independent decisions. Recent USDA surveys of contract poultry
farmers in the United States found that, in seeking outside advice on
their operations, these farmers now turn first to bankers and then to
the corporations that hold their contracts. If the contracting
corporation is also the same company that is selling the farm its seed
and fertilizer, as is often the case, there is a strong likelihood that the
company s procedures will be followed. That corporation, as a global
enterprise with no compelling local ties, is also less likely to be
concerned about the pollution and resource degradation created by
those procedures, at least compared with a farmer who is rooted in
that community. Grower contracts generally disavow any
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 3030.
Id. at 3032.
Id. at 3030.
Id. at 3023; see also LOCATING LIVESTOCK, supra note 152, at 39.
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environmental liability.185
In recognition of these increasingly common practices, the EPA
proposed to require that all entities that exert substantial operational
control over a CAFO be considered operators and co-permitted
under the NPDES program. Co-permittees would be held jointly
responsible for the management of the animal wastes, particularly for
manure generated in excess of what can be managed properly onsite.186
EPA s proposed rule continues to endorse the use of general
permits for most CAFOs.187 Under this approach, a CAFO would be
considered to have obtained a permit upon filing a Notice of Intent
(NOI) with the permitting authority. The NOI must include certain
information and, once filed, signifies the intention of the permittee to
comply with the conditions and requirements of the general permit.188
The most serious drawback with this approach is the absence of
opportunity for public involvement in permitting decisions and
difficulty in enforcing specific permit conditions. The EPA proposed
to address these concerns by suggesting criteria for when general
permits may not be appropriate for CAFOs. Under the proposal, the
permitting authority may require individual permits for CAFOs
where: (1) the CAFO is located in an environmentally sensitive area;
(2) the CAFO has a history of compliance or operational problems;
(3) the CAFO is considered an exceptionally large operation; and
(4) CAFOs that are significantly expanding their existing
operations.189 These criteria are to be established by the permitting
authority through a public process. In addition, any member of the
public may petition the permitting authority to require an individual
permit for a CAFO covered by a general permit.190
EPA s rules are not due to be finalized until the end of 2002.
Permit requirements will not go into effect for many CAFOs until
185.
2000).
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Brian Halweil, Where Have All the Farmers Gone?, 13:5 WORLD WATCH 12 (Sept. 1,
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 15, at 3025-27.
Id. at 3042.
Id.
Id. at 3043.
Id.
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2006.191
The proposed rules are a substantial step in the right direction, but
there is considerable room for improvement. First, EPA opted for
general permits, based on the supposition that individual permits for
all CAFOs would be too burdensome for permitting authorities.192 As
a practical matter, some resort to general permits may be needed. But
a more satisfactory approach would be to start with the assumption
that all CAFOs, like all other point sources, must obtain individual
permits, and then carve out some categories of CAFOs for treatment
under general permits. In this way, meaningful public participation
could be extended to a larger number of permit decisions, enhancing
the possibility of appropriate and enforceable permit conditions.
Requiring individual, pre-construction permits for new or expanding
CAFOs may be particularly important. Through a public process,
greater scrutiny can be given to critical decisions before they become
a fait accompli, such as the location of the CAFO itself or of waste
containment structures.
Second, the proposed rule, even in its most expansive iterations,
leaves large numbers of AFOs outside the reach of the NPDES.
While estimates of the total number of AFOs vary, it appears that
EPA s rules may exempt anywhere from roughly 185,000 to 340,000
AFOs as nonpoint sources not subject to the CWA s regulatory
program.193 Put in different terms, the proposed rule may exempt at
least twenty-eight percent of total AFO manure production from the
NPDES program, leaving control of these facilities to nonpoint
source programs.194
191. CAFO Factsheet, supra note 177, at 3.
192. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, supra note 15, at 3043.
193. In a supplemental notice, EPA provided data showing that the total number of AFOs
may be somewhere between 375,700 (EPA s estimate at the time the rules were proposed) and
218,320 (a USDA estimate). Notice of Data Availability; National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 58555, 58568 (Nov. 21, 2001). As
noted above, EPA proposed rule would capture, at most, about 31,000 AFO s within the
NPDES program.
194. The Unified National Strategy calls for all AFOs to implement Comprehensive
Nutrient Management Plans (CNMPs), which should address, as necessary, feed management,
manure handling and storage, land application of manure, land management, record keeping,
and other utilization options. Unified National Strategy, supra note 120, at §§ 3.1, 3.2. But, as
the Unified National Strategy emphasized:
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2. The Section 404 Permit Program
Apart from the NPDES program, the CWA also includes a permit
program governing discharges of dredged and fill material into
navigable waters.195 This program, referred to as the section 404
program, is administered jointly by the EPA and the Army Corps of
Engineers with the Corps responsible for issuing permits.196
The protection of wetlands on agricultural lands received a serious
blow recently by the Supreme Court s decision in Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.197 The
Court rejected a twenty-five-year-old standing interpretation of
section 404, and concluded that the Corps jurisdiction does not reach
to the extent of Congress s powers to regulate wetlands under the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Court held that, under
section 404, the Corps may not regulate isolated waters and
wetlands but rather is limited to regulation of wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters. 198 It is estimated that the Court s ruling will
remove eight million acres of agricultural wetlands from the
protection of the section 404 program.199 The impact of the Court s
decision may pose a significant threat of increased agricultural
nonpoint source pollution.
While the precise jurisdictional reach of this program remains

For the vast majority of AFOs, voluntary efforts will be the principal approach to assist
owners and operators in developing and implementing site-specific CNMPs, and in
reducing water pollution and public health risks associated with AFOs. While CNMPs
are not required for AFOs participating only in voluntary programs, they are strongly
encouraged as the best possible means of managing potential water quality and public
health impacts from these operations.
Id. § 4.1.
195. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
196. Id.
197. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
198. Id. at 171.
199. Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief for Congress, Soil and Water
Conservation Issues, at 6 (Jan. 29, 2002), at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRS/abstract.
cfm?NLEid=17007 [hereinafter Soil and Conservation Issues]. According to another report, the
Court s decision will remove 30-60% of the nation s wetlands from the section 404 program,
including 79% of wetlands in Wisconsin, 40% in Nebraska, 74% in Indiana, and 33% in
Delaware. Jon Kusler, The SWANCC Decision and State Regulation of Wetlands, 1, at
http://aswm.org/swancc/aswm-int.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2002). The cited Web page is an
excellent source of information on the implications of the Supreme Court s decision.
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controversial,200 the program applies to various agricultural activities
that destroy or degrade wetlands. Protection of wetlands can mitigate
some of the effects of agricultural practices that contribute to
nonpoint source pollution.201 The positioning in the landscape of
some wetlands in the transitional zone between uplands and water
resources, such as lakes and rivers, makes these wetlands natural and
highly effective pollution controls. Unique assemblages of wetland
vegetation are effective in processing, removing, and storing a variety
of pollutants, including sediment, nutrients, and some heavy
metals.202 The EPA recently advocated the protection and restoration
of wetlands as a significant measure to reduce the adverse effects of
nonpoint source pollution.203 Accordingly, the degree to which the
section 404 program protects wetlands significantly the amount of
nonpoint source pollution that enters surface waters, as well as the
costs of reducing nonpoint source pollution.204
As an historical matter, agriculture is the single most destructive
force on wetlands. Agriculture accounts for eighty percent of wetland
conversions in the period 1954-74, with the annual rate of wetland
losses of 593,000 acres.205 However, the rate of wetland loss to
agriculture decreased after the passage of the section 404 program,
but it still remains significant. From 1986 to 1997, twenty-six percent
of wetlands losses were attributable to agriculture.206 The relationship
200. See id. at 4-5; Pat Parenteau, Position Paper on Clean Water Act Jurisdiction
Determinations Pursuant to the Supreme Court s January 9, 2001 Decision, Solid Waste of
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), presented to
Administrator Whitman, United States Environmental Protection Agency by the Association of
State Wetland Managers and the Association of State Floodplain Managers (Dec. 2001), at
http://aswm.org/Swance/position.pdf.
201. See generally EPA, NATIONAL MANAGEMENT MEASURES TO PROTECT AND RESTORE
WETLANDS AND RIPARIAN AREAS FOR THE ABATEMENT OF NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION
(Draft, June 21, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/wetmeasures/.
202. Id. at 13.
203. Id. at 14.
204. This is also one of the key conclusions of the Clinton Administration s Clean Water
Action Plan. See CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 38.
205. RALPH E. HEIMLICH ET AL., WETLANDS AND AGRICULTURE: PRIVATE INTERESTS AND
PUBLIC BENEFITS, U.S.D.A. Agricultural Economic Report No. 765, at 20 (1998), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/der7651 (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).
206. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE
CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 1986-1997, at 11 (2000), available at http://wetlands.fws.gov/
status-trends/SandT2000Report.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).

64

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 9:21

between the section 404 program and agriculture has been, and
continues to be, an uneasy and controversial one.207
Many activities that involve mechanical destruction of wetlands
and wetland functions will require a permit from the Corps of
Engineers, but significant exceptions exist. The limited types of
regulated activities, exemptions from the requirements of section 404
for a number of agricultural activities, and actual program
implementation may permit a significant amount of wetland
conversion for agricultural use.
The section 404 program exempts normal farming, silviculture,
and ranching activities such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor
drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and forest
products, or upland soil and water conservation practices from the
permit requirement. 208 This exemption is, however, not as broad as it
first appears. The CWA also includes a recapture clause under
which the listed activities are subject to permits if they involve [a]ny
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters and
have as their purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a
use to which it was not previously subject, where the flow or
circulation of navigable waters may be impaired or the reach of such
waters be reduced . . . . 209
Because of this recapture clause, the courts construe the
exemption for normal farming activities quite narrowly.210 For
example, in Borden Ranch Partnership v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers,211 the court held that deep-ripping in wetlands a
process in which wetlands are disturbed by a tractor or bulldozer
207. See generally Joseph G. Theis, Wetlands Loss and Agriculture: The Failed Federal
Regulation of Farming Activities Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 9 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 (1991); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WETLANDS: THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM, Report No. GAO/RCED-88-110 (1988).
208. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A) (1994). Exemptions are also provided for construction or
maintenance of farm or stock ponds or irrigation ditches, or the maintenance of drainage
ditches, and construction or maintenance of farm roads. Id. § 1344(f)(1)(C), (E). Like the
exemption for normal farming activities, these exemptions are subject to section 404(f)(2) s
recapture clause.
209. Id. § 1342(f)(2).
210. See United States v. Bruce, 41 F.3d 117, 124 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Akers,
785 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1986); Avoyelles Sportsmen s League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 926
(5th Cir. 1983).
211. 261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001).
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dragging long metal prongs up to seven feet in length through the
wetland212 is not exempt from section 404 s permit requirements as
a normal farming activity.213 The court held:
although the Corps cannot regulate a farmer who desires
merely to change from one wetland crop to another,
activities that require substantial hydrological alterations
require a permit . . . . [T]he intent of Congress in enacting the
Act was to prevent conversion of wetlands to dry lands, and
we have classified as non-exempt those activities which
change a wetland s hydrological regime. 214
Nonetheless, some question exists about whether the recapture
clause applies to farming in wetlands previously converted through
means not regulated under section 404, i.e., by means other than a
discharge of dredged or fill material. 215 In addition, prior
converted cropland wetlands converted to agricultural use prior to
December, 1985 is exempt from the section 404 program, even if it
currently provides some measure of wetlands functions and values.216
Because permits are required only for discharges of dredged and
fill material, farmers may convert wetlands to agricultural uses
without permits by resorting to unregulated techniques, such a
draining or dredging operations that involve only limited incidental
fallback into wetlands.217 A significant number of activities that
212. Id. at 812.
213. Id. at 819.
214. Id. at 815-16 (citing United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 820, 822 (9th Cir. 1986);
see also United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 123-29 (3d Cir. 1994)).
215. See generally Memorandum from Lance Wood to All Division and District Counsels,
Evading 404 Jurisdiction by Pumping Water from Wetlands (Apr. 10, 1990), reproduced in
MARGARET N. STRAND, WETLANDS DESKBOOK 688 (2d ed. 1997). For a general discussion of
the section 404 program and agricultural activities, see Memorandum from Lajuara S. Wilcher
& Robert W. Page to the Field, Clean Water Act Section 404 Regulatory Program and
Agricultural Activities (May 3, 1990), reproduced in MARGARET N. STRAND, supra, at 682.
216. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(8) (2001).
217. See Nat l Mining Assoc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng rs, 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir.
1998). The types of activities regulated under section 404 as discharges of dredged and fill
material has been most controversial in circumstances where the alleged discharge involves
redepositing of disturbed soils and vegetation in wetlands. The courts tend to apply a
generous construction to the term discharge. See, e.g., Borden Ranch P ship, 261 F.3d at 810
(9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000); Avoyelles Sportsmen s
League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
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convert wetlands for agricultural purposes may thus escape scrutiny
under section 404. For example, in Orleans Audubon Society v. Lee,
the Fifth Circuit upheld the Corps of Engineers conclusion that it
lacked jurisdiction over the installation of a drainage system in
wetlands, because no jurisdictional discharges existed.218
Even for activities clearly regulated under section 404, applicable
regulations do not categorically preclude conversion of wetlands for
agricultural purposes. Instead, restraints on regulated activities in
wetlands are structured by a complex balancing of economic,
environmental, and other factors, and on conclusions about whether
alternative locations for the activity in question are practicable.219
Permit applicants have had remarkable success in convincing the
Corps that their proposed activities satisfy these applicable criteria.220
Generally, compensatory mitigation is required to offset losses of
wetland functions and values in pursuit of a no net loss policy, but
these mitigation requirements have been notoriously under-enforced,
leading to significant losses of wetland functions and values.221 In
addition, the Corps of Engineers nationwide permit program
authorizes agricultural activities that degrade or destroy wetlands
with little or no scrutiny by the Corps.222
218. 742 F.2d 901, 910-11 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Save Our Cmty. v. EPA, 971 F.2d
1155, 1163-64 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1997)
(Section 404 does not prohibit a non-polluting method of draining a wetland. ).
219. See generally WETLANDS DESKBOOK, supra note 215, at 41-45.
220. Statement of Michael Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works,
Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Clean Air,
Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety, United States Senate (Mar. 28, 2000), at
http://www.senate.gov/~epw/dav_0328.htm. Recently, the Corps reported:
[T]he Corps received an average of 74,500 Section 404 permit requests per year from
FY 1996 to FY 1999. Of those requests, 84.4 percent were authorized through a
general permit. Only 6.7 percent of all permit applications were subject to the more
detailed individual permit evaluation, through which impacts are avoided and
compensated. . . .[O]nly 3 tenths of a percent of all Section 404 requests were denied.
Id.
221. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND
LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 94-122 (2001), at http://books.nap.edu/books/
0309074320/html/index.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002). Recent changes to the Corps
mitigation practices may exacerbate the problem. See Cat Lazaroff, Army Corps Redefines
Wetlands Mitigation, Envtl. News Serv., Nov. 13, 2001, at http://ens.lycos.com/ens/
nov2001/2001L-11-13-06.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
222. The Corps recently reissued its nationwide permits. See Issuance of Nationwide
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B. Nonpoint Source Programs Under the Clean Water Act
Apart from the NPDES and section 404 programs, no provision
exists for direct federal regulation of agricultural nonpoint source
pollution that may contribute to water quality impairments. The Act s
national policy that programs for the control of nonpoint sources of
pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious
manner, 223 is pursued through several programs that provide
opportunities and funding to develop and implement control
measures for nonpoint sources, but the primary responsibility in each
of these programs lies with the states. Little or no authority exists for
federal involvement in the event states choose not to tackle nonpoint
source pollution in an effective way. Moreover, consistent with the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, nothing in the CWA compels
the states to adopt nonpoint source control programs.224
1. Comprehensive Planning and Section 208
With the 1972 amendments to the CWA, Congress included
comprehensive planning provisions to ensure that [t]o the extent
practicable, waste treatment management shall be on an areawide
basis and provide control or treatment of all point and nonpoint
sources of pollution, including in place or accumulated pollution
sources. 225 Section 208 required the states to identify each area
within the State, which, as a result of urban-industrial concentrations
or other factors, has substantial water quality control problems and
to designate (A) the boundaries of each such area, and (B) a single
representative organization . . . capable of developing effective
Permits; Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 2020 (Jan. 15, 2002). Newly issued nationwide permit 40
authorizes discharges into non-tidal wetlands to improve agricultural production provided
certain conditions are met. See id. at 2086-87.
223. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(7) (1994).
224. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 564 F.2d 573, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see
also Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2001) ( [N]othing in the
CWA demands that a state adopt a regulatory system for nonpoint sources. ). Compare New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (holding that Congress cannot commandeer
the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program )).
225. 33 U.S.C. § 1281(c).
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areawide waste treatment plans for such area. 226 Areawide plans
were to be in operation within one year of the organization s
designation227 and were to include a process to (i) identify, if
appropriate, agriculturally and silviculturally related nonpoint sources
of pollution . . . and (ii) set forth procedures and methods (including
land use requirements) to control to the extent feasible such
sources. 228
In addition, for areas of a state not designated under the process
described above, [t]he State shall act as a planning agency. 229 In
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, the court relied on this
latter provision to conclude that the section 208 planning program
applied to all parts of a state, not just those designated as having
substantial water quality problems.230 Section 208 thus provides for
comprehensive, state-wide programs to address water quality
problems, including nonpoint source pollution.
Section 208 provides three basic incentives for states to develop
areawide plans. First, the costs of developing and implementing the
plans are supposed to be shared by the federal government through
EPA grants.231 Second, once a plan is approved, the state may
participate in a program administered by the Department of
Agriculture through which the Soil Conservation Service (now the
Natural Resource Conservation Service) enters into cost-sharing
contracts with property owners for the purpose of installing and
maintaining measures incorporating best management practices to
control nonpoint source pollution for improved water quality . . . 232
Finally, comprehensive plans of the sort authorized in section 208
may enable the states to make judgments about how best to allocate
cleanup responsibilities.
The statute does not, however, provide clear criteria under which
226. Id. § 1288(a)(2).
227. Id. § 1288(b)(1)(A).
228. Id. § 1288(b)(2)(F).
229. Id. § 1288(a)(6).
230. 564 F.2d 573, 577-79 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
231. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(f). EPA also provides technical assistance without reimbursement
to the states in developing plans. Id. § 1288(g).
232. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(j). This program was limited to contracts ending no later than
September 31, 1988. Id. It was added to the CWA by amendments in 1977. See Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 35, 91 Stat. 1579 (1977).
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EPA may determine whether a plan s provisions are adequate. As a
consequence, the content of these plans is largely discretionary with
the states, creating a program that Professor Adler describes as
mandatory-voluntary. 233 Moreover, in the event that a plan is
disapproved, there is nothing in the CWA comparable to the Clean
Air Act s mandate for federal implementation plans to substitute for
such state failings.234 The EPA lacks authority to take up the slack of
under-performing states by implementing its own enforceable
areawide management plan. Other avenues of recourse open to the
EPA, such as withholding grants or conditioning grants on a state s
adoption of control measures,235 are limited and have not been
pursued to any significant extent.236 While a number of plans were
written and approved, the consensus is that the plans did little to
improve water quality or to create effective state programs aimed at
nonpoint source pollution.237 As if to punctuate the ineffectiveness of
the section 208 planning provisions, Congress ceased funding the
grants program in 1981.238 In effect, many of the section 208 plans
233. Adler, Watershed Protection, supra note 132, at 1042.
234. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (2001) (requiring the EPA to promulgate a federal
implementation plan if a state fails to develop state ambient air pollution control plans).
235. See Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. P ship v. EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 791 (4th Cir. 1988)
(concluding that while section 208 provides no direct mechanism by which EPA can force the
states to adopt adequate nonpoint source pollution control programs . . . Congress anticipated
that EPA would use the threat and promise of federal financial assistance to accomplish this
task ).
236. Id.
237. See Adler, Watershed Protection, supra note 132, 1043. Professor Adler notes several
reasons for the failure of comprehensive planning under section 208, including a lack of
enthusiasm for the program on EPA s part, the absence of any link between planning and
implementation, inadequate funding, and resistance from local officials fearful of federal
planning mandates. See id. at 1044 (citing S. REP. NO. 257, at 46 (1994). David Zaring sums up
the effectiveness of the section 208 program:
Section 208 planning agencies promote voluntary compliance rather than mandatory
controls of nonpoint source pollution; the latter were too controversial and
politically sensitive for agricultural interests who opposed what they envisioned
could amount to command and control regulation. States were unwilling to provoke
powerful agricultural constituencies with strict regulation when the Federal
Government did not obligate them to do so. The resulting nonpoint source pollution
control plans were totally voluntary in 41 states. An additional eight states included
many voluntary provisions.
Zaring, supra note 11, at 523-24 (references omitted).
238. Id.
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were simply shelved.239
Aside from its structural shortcomings, several additional
problems severely handicapped the section 208 program. The
program lacked administrative support in its formative stages. The
Nixon administration basically was trying to close the program out
. . . [T]here was a very definite attitude . . . that it was not a good
program, and . . . should not be given any encouragement. 240 As a
consequence, EPA was slow to issue regulations and guidance.
Appropriated funds were not obligated and, therefore, fifteen percent
of all monies authorized for the section 208 program as of 1980
simply lapsed.241 EPA s efforts, as well as those of the states, were
directed primarily at funding and building municipal waste treatment
plants and advancing the NPDES point source control program; the
section 208 program was treated, in effect, as a disfavored
stepchild and subordinated to efforts that produced more
immediate, visible results.242 EPA s lack of commitment and uneven
funding led many to conclude that the section 208 program simply
was not credible.243
State agencies repeatedly attributed the poor performance of
section 208 plans to a lack of data to establish cause-and-effect
relations between practices and nonpoint source pollution and, hence,
between practices and water quality impacts. These same data
shortcomings hampered state efforts to determine the efficacy and
cost-effectiveness of various best management practices (BMPs)
that might decrease runoff.244 As a consequence, no clear linkages
between section 208 planning and the attainment of water quality
standards exist.245
239. ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 184 (1993)
[hereinafter 20 YEARS LATER].
240. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, NONPOINT POLLUTION AND THE AREAWIDE
WASTE TREATMENT PROGRAM UNDER THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT:
SUMMARY OF HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW, JULY 11,
12, 17, AND 18, 1979, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print 96-67, at 16 n.2 (1980) (quoting
EPA Administrator) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF HEARINGS].
241. Id. at 16.
242. Id. at 22.
243. Id. at 18.
244. Id. at 19.
245. 20 YEARS LATER, supra note 239, at 184.
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The lack of adequate data also had other significant effects on the
nonpoint source elements of the section 208 program. The need for
data prompted a significant shift in the focus of the section 208
program once the EPA became somewhat more sympathetic with its
objectives. EPA began to emphasize and fund prototype
demonstration projects as a means to fill data gaps and to determine
the sorts of management practices that would most cost-effectively
reduce nonpoint source pollution.246 While EPA could boast of the
success of many of these projects, the shift led one observer to
describe the program as a giant research project. 247
The absence of clear linkages between BMPs and improvements
in water quality made it difficult to develop regulatory programs,
leaving most states to rely on voluntary cooperation rather than
enforceable measures. The consensus view was that regulators
[were] not at the point where, under a burden of proof test, they could
conclusively link a particular management practice to a desired
result. 248 As a consequence, BMPs tended to be implemented only
when they served coincidental objectives, such as soil conservation or
more cost-effective agricultural production.249
Other factors that hampered the section 208 program include
conflicts between local, state, and federal officials over lines of
responsibility for program implementation; uncertainty over whether
state programs should rely on voluntary cooperation or on more
regulatory approaches; and the lack of public education, and, hence,
support, for nonpoint source control programs.250
246. SUMMARY OF HEARINGS, supra note 240, at 23.
247. Id. at 25.
248. Id. at 33; see also id. at 29 ( It is not sufficient merely to conjecture that BMPs will be
good; it must be proven . . . . ).
249. Id. at 33.
250. See 20 YEARS LATER, supra note 239, at 184; SUMMARY OF HEARINGS, supra note
240, at 27-34. Professor Michael Vandenbergh concludes that a major obstacle to effective
control of nonpoint source pollution which he describes as a second generation source
problem is the social meaning of the command and control system. Michael P.
Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 191, 191-93, 196 (2001). He posits that the command and control regulation of large
industrial sources facilitated the conveyance of an us-them sort of mentality on the part of
individual citizens: The command and control system . . . allowed individuals to support
environmental protection by focusing both economic costs and moral opprobrium on industrial
polluters. Id. at 208. Presumably, this focus makes it more difficult to regulate farmers because

72

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 9:21

2. The Section 319 Nonpoint Source Management Program
Prior to 1987, section 208 was the only CWA program to control
nonpoint source pollution.251 With its relative demise and the active
opposition of the Reagan Administration to any new federal
programs to address nonpoint source pollution control, there was a
gaping hole in federal efforts to address water quality problems
throughout the early- and mid-1980s.
In 1987, Congress responded to this lacuna by amending the
CWA to address nonpoint source pollution. It subjected urban and
industrial stormwater discharges to the requirements of the NPDES
program.252 For agriculture, Congress took a different approach,
creating a new, but essentially unenforceable, nonpoint source
management program.253 Section 319 provides that each state must
prepare and submit for EPA approval a report that: identifies waters
within the state which, without control of nonpoint source pollution,
are not reasonably expected to attain or maintain water quality
standards; identifies categories of or particular nonpoint sources
which contribute significantly to water quality problems in such
waters; describes how best management practices for such sources
will be identified; and describes applicable state and local nonpoint
source pollution control programs.254 In addition, each state must
prepare and submit for EPA approval a management program for
controlling the nonpoint source pollution that contributes
significantly to water quality impairments and must implement that
they have not traditionally been viewed as an industry, and thus do not fall within the
cognitively available category of polluters. Interestingly, many environmental groups have
worked hard to overcome this cognitive resistance, carefully characterizing some farming
operations as being in the corporate and factory categories. See, e.g., CESSPOOLS OF
SHAME, supra note 100, at 1 ( Multi-million dollar corporations control many factory farms. ).
251. SUMMARY OF HEARINGS, supra note 240, at 14 (noting that [t]he only Federal
program which directly addresses nonpoint source pollution is found in section 208 of the Clean
Water Act ).
252. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2001).
253. Id. § 1329. In describing the 1987 amendments, Professor Houck noted that Congress
in effect split the nonpoint world into urban and agricultural sources. Oliver A. Houck,
Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America s Coastal Zone, 47 MD. L. REV. 358, 376 (1988)
[hereinafter Houck, Ending the War].
254. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a).
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plan within four fiscal years of the date the plan is submitted to
EPA.255
Section 319 management plans must include certain elements:
BMPs; a program to implement the BMPs, including a schedule
containing annual milestones and provid[ing] for utilization of the
best management practices at the earliest practicable date; and
sources of funding.256
The primary incentive for states to comply with section 319 s
reporting and programmatic requirements, like the incentives in the
section 208 program, is a cost-sharing grant program.257 In addition,
continued participation in the grant program is conditioned on a
performance standard, albeit a very weak one: states must make
satisfactory progress in meeting their respective programs
milestones.258 States must also maintain its aggregate expenditures
from all other sources . . . at or above the average level of such
expenditures in its two fiscal years preceding the date of the 1987
amendments to remain eligible for 319 grants.259 In many cases,
however, this maintenance of effort requirement is, in fact, no
requirement at all. For example, Missouri s Nonpoint Source
Management Plan notes that in the relevant period, the state
expended no funds on nonpoint source pollution control; its
maintenance of effort requirement was, therefore, zero.260 Finally,
states may be induced to participate in the section 319 program in
order to benefit from the program s consistency provision,261 which
255. Id. § 1329(b)(1).
256. Id. § 1329(b)(2). The report of waters and the management program were to be
submitted to EPA before August 4, 1988. See id. § 1329(c)(2).
257. Id. § 1329(h).
258. Id. § 1329(h)(8).
259. Id. § 1329(h)(9).
260. STATE OF MISSOURI, NONPOINT SOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN 108 (revised 2001), at
http://www.dnr.state.mo.us/deq/wpcp/wpcnpsmp.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
261. Section 319 provides, in part:
[E]ach Federal department and agency shall modify existing regulations to allow
States to review individual development projects and assistance applications under . . .
Federal assistance programs [identified by each State] and shall accommodate,
according to the requirements and definitions of Executive Order 12372 . . . the
concerns of the State regarding the consistency of such applications or projects with
the State nonpoint source pollution management program.
33 U.S.C. § 1329(k). EPA did not propose to published guidance on the consistency provision
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is a form of reverse federal preemption . . . [that] [s]tates can
invoke . . . to block federal and federally-funded projects that
interfere with state nonpoint pollution controls. 262
EPA has oversight responsibility for ensuring that states submit
the required section 319 reports and management plans. The
program, like the section 208 planning provisions, remains largely
optional for the states.263 If a state fails to submit a report listing
waters affected by nonpoint source pollution, or if EPA disapproves
such a report, then EPA is to promulgate one.264 By contrast, the EPA
lacks authority to prepare and implement a management plan for
states who choose not to do so, although provisions are made for
local agencies to assume the state s role in such circumstances.265 For
waters affected by out-of-state nonpoint source pollution, the EPA
may convene . . . a management conference of all States which
contribute significant pollution resulting from nonpoint sources, 266
but again, the EPA has no authority to develop or implement a plan to
correct such interstate pollution problems if the management
conference fails to yield an agreement among the states.267
Moreover, even if states do produce management plans, section
319 does not require that the plans contain enforceable measures.
Indeed, the statute rather explicitly suggests that BMPs or other
controls need not be enforceable.268 As Professor Craig has noted,
until 1998. See Section 319 Federal Consistency Guidance, 63 Fed. Reg. 45504 (Aug. 26,
1998).
262. Mandelker, supra note 22, at 499-500.
263. Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water QualityBased Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. 10391, 10400 (Aug. 1997)
(concluding that [section] 319 s provisions are voluntary. States may choose to participate or
not; participating states may choose regulatory approaches or not ) [hereinafter Houck, Are We
There Yet].
264. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(d)(3).
265. Id. § 1329(e).
266. Id. § 1329(g).
267. Id. § 1329(e).
268. See id. § 1329(b)(2)(B) (requiring management plans to include programs (including,
as appropriate, nonregulatory or regulatory programs . . .) to achieve implementation of the
[BMPs] ). John Davidson also observed:
[T]he management programs . . . may be less than meets the eye. Although the
language of . . . [§ 319] directs the state to develop plans that contain specific control
measures, it is likely that the plans must state merely what would be done if a state has
the money it needs. In their plans the states will say, Here is what we will do if we get
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Section 319 does not require states to penalize nonpoint source
polluters who fail to adopt best management practices; rather it
provides for grants to encourage the adoption of such practices. 269
This continued reliance on a voluntary approach to agricultural
nonpoint source pollution has led one commentator to conclude that,
[i]n 1987 Congress looked agricultural pollution in the eye and
fainted. 270
Congress underfunded the section 319 program for the first
several years, providing little support even to states that were making
serious efforts to address nonpoint source pollution.271 The Clinton
Administration increased funding to some degree,272 but inadequate
funding remains the biggest obstacle to improvements under section
319.273 Without assurances that the costs of attacking agricultural
nonpoint source pollution will be underwritten by the federal
government, most states are unwilling, or unable, to attack
agricultural nonpoint source pollution aggressively.274 Because the
EPA lacks any authority to threaten regulatory action to correct state
program deficiencies, the only effective way to achieve greater gains
through section 319 is to increase funding for the program
substantially.
Even with increased funding, however, the absence of clear
performance standards for state management plans makes it difficult
to ensure that section 319 funds are used effectively. The statutory
the money. . . . If funds are inadequate we won t do it, . . . and if implementing the
plans in our state will be politically unpopular, we won t even apply for the grant.
John H. Davidson, Thinking About Nonpoint Sources of Water Pollution and South Dakota
Agriculture, 34 S.D. L. REV. 20, 45 (1989) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
269. Craig, supra note 11, at 190 (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d
1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1990)).
270. Houck, Ending the War, supra note 253, at 377.
271. See 20 YEARS LATER, supra note 239, at 189.
272. See GAO REPORT 99-45, supra note 128, at 28.
273. See National Association of Conservation Districts, Funding for Clean Water Act
Section 319 (Mar. 2001), at http://www.nacdnet.org/govtaff/issuepapers/2001/Funding
319in02.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).
274. Aside from funding deficiencies, Professor Adler argues that the EPA hampers
section 319 s potential as an aggressive measure to control nonpoint source pollution by
refusing to play hardball with the states. Adler, Watershed Protection, supra note 132, at
1045 n.427. He points out that the EPA could insist on the states adopting mandatory or stricter
BMPs as a condition of program approval. See id.
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satisfactory progress condition for a state s continuing participation
in the program is an extraordinarily vague benchmark.275 EPA
regulations do not strengthen or clarify this requirement,276 although
the agency has recently issued guidance to provide greater specificity
in the expected outcomes to be achieved by funded projects.277
Successful implementation of nonpoint source controls under
section 319 is likely to be hampered by inadequate monitoring and
assessment data as well as the absence of any requirement that states
enact enforceable controls. The CWA includes a broad reporting
obligation which requires the states to submit a description of the
water quality of all navigable waters in such State, as well as a
description of the nature and extent of nonpoint sources of
pollutants. 278 The states, as noted above, have not collected suitable
data of this sort. Without the data, it may be hard to establish the
linkages section 319 apparently demands between impaired waters
and nonpoint sources. Thus, the same difficulties that hampered
areawide planning and nonpoint source controls under section 208
limit the willingness or ability of the states to take effective action
under section 319.
To its credit, the EPA has recognized that [w]ithout a clear
understanding of how to minimize pollution from . . . nonpoint
sources, state and local organizations will be unable to develop
strategies to protect their water resources. 279 To bridge this gap, the
EPA established a Section 319 Nonpoint Source National
275. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)(8) (1994).
276. See 40 C.F.R. § 35.268(d)(3) (2001).
277. The guidance modifies the states reporting requirements under the section 319 grants
program. See Memorandum from Robert Wayland, to EPA Regional Water Division Directors,
Modifications to Nonpoint Source Reporting Requirements for Section 319 Grants (Sept. 27,
2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/Section319/grts.html. The memorandum
notes that the increased funding for the grants program was giving rise to more specific
questions from Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and the public as to how and
where this money is being spent, and what water quality improvements are being achieved as
the result of these Federal expenditures. Id. The states are obligated to report on their funded
activities under 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)(11). Many states have revised their nonpoint source
management programs in response to this guidance.
278. 33 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1).
279. LAURA A. LOMBARDO ET AL., SECTION 319 NONPOINT SOURCE NATIONAL
MONITORING PROGRAM: SUCCESSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2000), available at
http://www5.bae.ncsu.edu/programs/extension/wqg/section319/frontcover.html (last visited
Apr. 22, 2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL MONITORING PROGRAM].
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Monitoring Program. The purpose of the program is to evaluate the
effectiveness of nonpoint source pollution management measures and
to gain a better understanding of nonpoint source pollution
generally.280 The program provides enhanced funding and technical
assistance for a limited number of pilot projects to facilitate[] the
understanding of processes that govern the transport and control of
nonpoint source pollution, which can then be transferred to state and
local organizations for use in addressing water quality problems. 281
The parallels to the section 208 program implementation as a
research project are somewhat striking, though the section 319
program is not limited to projects funded under the Nonpoint Source
National Monitoring Program.
Section 319 made some significant differences in a limited
number of watersheds.282 In 1995, the General Accounting Office
reported on the 618 watershed projects to reduce agricultural
nonpoint source pollution that were planned or carried out.283 The
report selected nine projects for evaluation, and the results were
generally regarded as successful.284 Similarly, the Nonpoint Source
National Monitoring Program yielded some significant improvements
in water quality in the projects sponsored under the program.285 In
addition, the EPA is considering ways in which section 319 might be
more effective.286 Nonetheless the scope of these successes is quite
limited, primarily because most states have very weak programs,287
280. See id. at 3.
281. Id.
282. The EPA s nonpoint source pollution Web site has links to section 319 success
stories, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/cwact.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).
283. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AGRICULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
INFORMATION ON AND CHARCTERISTICS OF SELECTED WATERSHED PROJECTS, Report No.
GAO/RCED-95-218, at 1 (1995).
284. See id. at 10.
285. NATIONAL MONITORING PROGRAM, supra note 280, at 3-9.
286. See, e.g., EPA, Nonpoint Sources: Picking up the Pace, EPA s Draft Proposed
Strategy for Strengthening Nonpoint Source Management, presentation prepared for Meeting of
Stakeholders in the National Nonpoint Source Program at the Wye River Conference Center on
October 14, 1997, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/nsfsnsm/ (last visited Mar. 13,
2002). Many of the suggestions in this presentation were subsequently incorporated into the
Clinton administration s Clean Water Action Plan.
287. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., ENFORCEABLE STATE MECHANISMS FOR
CONTROL OF NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION iii (1997) ( Agriculture is the most
problematic area for enforceable mechanisms. Many laws of general applicability, . . . have
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and the possibilities for significant increases in funding are small, at
least in the short-term.288 The net effect of the section 319 program is,
as John Davidson has noted, largely redundant of the section 208
planning requirements,289 leav[ing] any resulting improvements in
water quality largely to the political will of individual states. 290
3. The TMDL Program A Framework for a Regulatory
Approach to Nonpoint Source Pollution?
The absence of authority in either section 208 or section 309 for
the EPA to step in when state efforts are inadequate severely
constrains any incentives the states may have to control agricultural
nonpoint source pollution. Indeed, Professor Houck has described
these programs as essentially ineffectual planning exercises. 291 This
general deficiency in the CWA s programs for controlling nonpoint
source pollution may be offset by a recent resurrection of a longneglected program referred to as section 303(d) s TMDL program.
Like the section 309 program, the TMDL program requires states
to identify waterbodies that are currently failing to meet water quality
standards. The requirement in section 303(d) is not limited to waters
where attainment of the standards is due solely to nonpoint source
pollution.292 For these impaired waters, states must establish . . . the
exceptions for agriculture. Where state laws exist, they often defer to incentives, cost-sharing,
and voluntary programs. ).
288. The Bush Administration s proposed budget includes $20 million for pilot projects
in a new watershed initiative. See BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL YEAR 2003, at
308, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/budget.html (last visited Mar.
13, 2002). Overall, the EPA s discretionary budget will, under the Bush proposal, be decreased
by $300 million. See id. at 401, Table S-7.
289. Davidson, supra note 267, at 44.
290. Id. at 43.
291. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 135-36.
292. 33 U.S.C. §1313(d)(1)(A) (2001) provides:
Each State shall identify those waters within its boundaries for which the [point
source] effluent limitations required by [the NPDES program] are not stringent enough
to implement any water quality standard applicable to such waters. The State shall
establish a priority ranking for such waters, taking into account the severity of the
pollution and the uses to be made of such waters.
Id. Strictly speaking, the § 1313(d) requirements are not limited to impaired waters. Section
1313(d)(3) provides:
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total maximum daily load, for those pollutants [identified by EPA] as
suitable for such calculation. 293 The total maximum daily loads
(TMDLs) are to be established at a level necessary to implement the
applicable water quality standards with seasonal variations. 294
Recognizing that linkages between discharges and ambient water
quality are subject to large measures of uncertainty, Congress
directed that TMDLs include a margin of safety which takes into
account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between
effluent limitations and water quality. 295 Although the statute does
not clearly require it, the EPA concluded that a TMDL must
allocate[] . . . pollutant loads among sources, and provide[] the basis
for attaining or maintaining water quality standards. 296
The statute requires that lists of impaired waterbodies and TMDLs
be submitted to the EPA, but the statute is fairly casual about setting
a timetable for such submissions.297 The first such submission are
to be made within six months of the EPA action identifying the
pollutants for which TMDLs are appropriate.298 This EPA action was
to take place no later than October 18, 1973.299 After the first such
submission the content of which is not specified the statute
requires states to submit lists and TMDLs from time to time. 300
Should EPA disapprove either the lists or the corresponding
TMDLs, the statute requires the agency to correct the deficiencies

For the specific purpose of developing information, each State shall identify all waters
within its boundaries which it has not identified [as being impaired under
§ 1313(d)(1)(A)] and estimate for such waters the total maximum daily load . . . at a
level that would assure protection and propagation of a balanced indigenous
population of fish, shellfish and wildlife.
Id. § 1313(d)(3). These informational TMDLs are not, however, required to be submitted to
the EPA and the EPA, has no express authority to approve or disapprove of them. See
Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1344 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
293. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
294. Id.
295. Id. On the margin of safety requirement s ability to bridge gaps in knowledge,
particularly for nonpoint source pollution. See Adler, supra note 2, at 272-73.
296. TMDL Rule, supra note 16, at 43588.
297. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).
298. Id.
299. Id. § 1314(a)(2).
300. Id. § 1313(d)(2).
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with its own lists and/or TMDLs.301 Curiously, however, the statute
remains silent concerning EPA s duties in the event that a state
simply submits nothing at all. Approved or EPA-promulgated
TMDLs must be incorporated by each state into a continuing
planning process that will result in plans for all navigable waters
within the state.302 The statute does not, however, clearly require
that states actually implement TMDLs, nor does it provide a clear
mechanism for doing so.303
For many years, the TMDL provisions were ignored, largely
because EPA and states preferred to focus on controlling point
sources, and perhaps, because they held a faint hope that resorting to
the safety net of TMDLS to attain water quality standards would
never be necessary.304 Critical ambiguities or omissions in the statute
and the EPA s lack of enthusiasm for the program contributed to this
relative neglect.305
The EPA first proposed regulations identifying pollutants
appropriate for TMDLs in 1973, but did not issue final rules until
much later, in 1978.306 Without the regulations in place, the states
were under no obligation to submit the section 303(d) lists and
301. Id.
302. Id. § 1313(e).
303. Section 303(e)(2) can plausibly be read to suggest that Congress meant to require
TMDL implementation, but it does not state so in direct terms. That section requires EPA to
review each state s continuous planning process and provides that EPA shall not approve any
State permit program under [the NPDES program] for any State which does not have an
approved continuing planning process . . . . 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(2). The same inference of
congressional intent requiring TMDL implementation may be gleaned from section 303(d)(4),
which provides that effluent limitations based on TMDLs may be revised only in certain,
limited circumstances where attainment of water quality standards will not be compromised.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4). In addition, as Professor Houck argued, EPA can demand that
TMDL allocations to point sources be implemented through its authority under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(d) to review permit decisions by the states. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at
60. Nonetheless, Professor Houck notes that, [o]nce [the lists of impaired waterbodies] and
TMDLs are prepared, the language of § 303(d) ends. Id.
304. See Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1354-55 (N.D. Cal. 2000); HOUCK,
TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 49.
305. See HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 49-51.
306. EPA proposed such regulations in 1973, Water Quality Criteria, 38 Fed. Reg. 29646
(Oct. 26, 1973), but final regulations were not promulgated until 1978, under compulsion of a
court order. See Total Maximum Daily Loads Under Clean Water Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 42303
(Sept. 14, 1978) (citing Board of County Comm rs of Calvert County v. Costle, No. 78-0572,
slip op. (D.D.C. June 20, 1978)).
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TMDLs.307 When the rules were promulgated, the agency
downplayed the significance of the program to a considerable extent.
The EPA suggested that states satisfied their statutory obligation to
make their first submission by simply identifying one or more
impaired waterbodies and TMDLs.308 The states took the cue and
submitted only a few TMDLs, but many simply did not submit
anything.309 State inaction, EPA concluded, simply had to be
tolerated. In EPA s view, the absence of express authority to act in
response to a state s inaction meant that EPA could not use the threat
of federal TMDLs to force state action. Thus, yielding the
anomalous conclusion that EPA intervention is called for in response
to inadequate state performance, but not in response to no state
performance. 310
After a series of lawsuits culminating in court orders requiring
EPA to promulgate TMDLs for states that failed to submit TMDLs or
for states that submitted inadequate ones,311 EPA began to take the
initiative in fashioning a credible TMDL program. It completed
rulemaking to revise the TMDL program in July, 2000.312 Due to
congressional action, the rules will not go into effect until April 30,
2003. There is, also, a strong possibility that the rules may be
substantially revised in the interim period.313
EPA s rules address and resolve several critical issues. First, the
rules make clear that states must include in their lists, and prepare
TMDLs for, waterbodies that are impaired exclusively or in part by
nonpoint source pollution.314 As might be expected, agribusiness and
307. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Homestake Mining Co.
v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279 (D. S.D. 1979); see Houck, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 4950.
308. See HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 51.
309. Id. at 51.
310. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 66-67 n.32.
311. See HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 51-56. For a summary of TMDL
litigation as of 2001, see MID-ATLANTIC ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER, TOTAL MAXIMUM
DAILY LOAD (TMDL) LITIGATION SUMMARY (June 2001), available at http://www.cwn.org/
docs/programs/tmdl/policy/tmdlpolicy.htm#litigation.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
312. See TMDL Rule, supra note 16, at 43586.
313. See Effective Date Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management
Regulation, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,044 (Oct. 18, 2001).
314. TDML Rule, supra note 16, at 43,588, 43,606, 43,609-10.

82

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 9:21

forestry interests vehemently oppose this conclusion.315 Second, the
rules require that TMDLs include eleven specific elements,
including: wasteload allocations ; load allocations ; [a] margin of
safety ; [a]llowance for reasonably foreseeable increases in
pollutant loads including future growth ; and, importantly, [a]n
implementation plan. 316 Third, states must submit TMDLS as
expeditiously as practicable but no later than specified deadlines.317
The EPA s rules also provide that states must allocate the
necessary reductions in pollutant loadings between wasteload
allocations and load allocations. The former pertains to reductions
from point sources to be made through NPDES permits.318 The latter
includes [t]he portion of a TMDL s pollutant load allocated to a
nonpoint source, storm water source for which a [NPDES] permit is
not required, atmospheric deposition, ground water, or background
source of pollutants. 319 EPA made clear that in establishing TMDLs,
states were free to make reduction trade-offs between nonpoint and
point sources. For example, A TMDL provides the opportunity to
compare relative contributions of pollutants from all sources and
consider technical and economic trade-offs between point and
nonpoint sources. 320
The rules plainly require the states to include plans demonstrating
how TMDLS will be implemented.321 For waste load allocations to
315. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 61.
316. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(h) (2001).
317. Id. § 130.28(b). The deadlines are: no later than 10 years from July 10, 2000, if the
waterbody and pollutant was listed . . . before that date ; or 10 years from the due date of the
first subsequent list after July 10, 2000, on which the waterbody and pollutant is initially
included. Id. Extensions of up to five years are available. Id. Lists of impaired waters must be
submitted every four years, beginning in 2002. Id. § 130.30(a).
318. Id. § 130.2(g).
319. Id. § 130.2(f).
320. Id. § 130.32(a); see also id. § 130.2(g) ( For waterbodies impaired by both point and
nonpoint sources, wasteload allocations may reflect anticipated or expected reductions of
pollutants from other sources if those anticipated or expected reductions are supported by
reasonable assurance that they will occur. ).
321. 40 C.F.R. § 130.32(b)(11) & § 130.32(c). EPA also stated in the preamble:
EPA believes that implementation of TMDLs is the most important aspect of today s
rule. Without implementation, TMDLs are merely paper plans to attain water quality
standards. The implementation plan requirement assures that the Nation s remaining
water quality problems will actually be addressed by appropriate actions identified in
the implementation plans submitted as part of the TMDLs.
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point sources, the NPDES program reasonably assures
implementation.322 For load allocations to nonpoint sources,
assurances that TMDLs will be actually implemented may be more
difficult. The rule does not require that load allocations to nonpoint
sources be based on enforceable state requirements; instead, states are
merely required to provide [a] description of specific regulatory or
voluntary actions, including management measures or other controls,
by Federal, State or local governments . . . that provide reasonable
assurance . . . that load allocations will be implemented and achieve
the assigned load reductions. 323 Reasonable assurance, as to
nonpoint sources, requires a showing that the measures on which a
state proposes to rely are directed at the pollutant and waterbody of
concern, will be implemented as expeditiously as practicable, are
reliable and effectively delivered, and are adequately funded.324 EPA
indicated that reliance on existing programs may provide the suite of
control actions and management measures for States to rely on when
meeting the reasonable assurance test. 325 As James Boyd noted,
state law will ultimately determine the effectiveness of the TMDL
program s long-run implementation. 326
One of the more prominent shortcomings of this approach is that
the load allocations are not likely to be viewed as effluent
limitations that can be directly enforced against sources under the
CWA s citizen suit provision.327 Accordingly, aside from the states
See TDML Rule, supra note 16, at 43,625.
322. See Boyd, supra note 11, at 67. EPA could effectively oversee implementation of
waste load allocations through its authority to review, object to, and revise, state-issued NPDES
permits, see 33 U.S.C. § 402(d), or through its authority to withdraw approval of state NPDES
programs. See id. § 402(c) (1994).
323. 40 C.F.R. § 130.32(c)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).
324. Id. § 130.2(p)(2).
325. See TDML Rule, supra note 16, at 43600.
326. Boyd, supra note 11, at 66.
327. See Or. Natural Desert Ass n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1998); Or. Natural
Res. Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987). In Or. Natural Desert,
the court noted:
Nonpoint source pollution is not regulated directly by the Act, but rather through
federal grants for state wastewater treatment plans. Section 208 of the Act requires
each such plan to contain procedures for the identification and control of nonpoint
source pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2). If the EPA approves a state s plan, it may
make grants to the state to defray the costs of administering the plan, see 33 U.S.C.
§ 1288(f), or to construct facilities, see 33 U.S.C. § 1288(g). Thus, the Act provides no
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themselves which historically have not aggressively addressed
nonpoint source pollution effective implementation of TMDLs
relying on nonpoint source controls will depend upon EPA s
willingness to use its carrots and sticks to induce appropriate state
action.
The rules also provide that EPA must promulgate a list of
impaired waters and corresponding TMDLs if a state fails to submit
lists and/or TMDLs or makes a submission that EPA disapproves.328
The rules also require EPA, like the states, to provide reasonable
assurance that its TMDLs will be implemented.329 These assurances,
however, take the form of using the EPA s funding and regulatory
authority to induce states to implement the TMDLs. The agency,
however, did not assert authority to enforce TMDL load allocations
to nonpoint sources directly against those sources.330 Indeed, EPA
explicitly noted:
The CWA preserves the rights of States to experiment with
alternative regulatory (and non-regulatory) approaches to
control nonpoint sources of pollution. The CWA does not
provide specific legal authority for EPA to regulate nonpoint
sources in a way that would assure the attainment of water
quality standards. Such authority is reserved for the States.331
In another important phrasing, EPA made clear its view that
affected citizens could not force the EPA or the states to implement
load allocations to nonpoint sources through citizen suits. The agency
stated that [n]othing in this rule . . . creates in EPA[,] or the States[,]
new legal authority beyond that provided by existing . . . law to
direct mechanism to control nonpoint source pollution but rather uses the threat and
promise of federal grants to the states to accomplish this task . . . . Section 1329,
added to the Act in 1987, requires states to adopt nonpoint source management
programs and similarly provides for grants to encourage a reduction in nonpoint source
pollution.
172 F.3d at 1096-97.
328. 40 C.F.R. § 130.30(b), 130.34(a)(1), 130.35.
329. Id. § 130.34(b).
330. Id. § 130.34(b) & (c) ( conditioning Clean Water Act grants to the fullest extent
practicable and use . . . of [EPA s] statutory or regulatory authorities and voluntary,
incentive-based programs . . . to supplement conditioning Clean Water Act grants ).
331. See TDML Rule, supra note 16, at 43,650.
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implement load allocations for nonpoint sources or creates for EPA
[or] States . . . a mandatory duty to do so. 332
Professor Houck noted that the re-emergence of the TMDL
program is forcing a showdown on the last water quality frontier,
nonpoint source pollution. 333 Yet, a major controversy in the TMDL
program is the extent to which the program may authorize or even
require states to adopt controls on nonpoint sources and, if states fail
to do so, whether EPA may step in and take appropriate action to cure
state deficiencies.334 EPA s rules suggest that EPA is ready and
willing to take aggressive action to ensure that TMDLs are adopted
and implemented. Yet, the extent of its legal authority to do so is
severely constrained.
The first showdown on the TMDL program reached a mixed
result. In Pronsolino v. Marcus, the court considered whether listing
and TMDLs are required for rivers and waters polluted only by
logging and agricultural runoff and/or other nonpoint sources . . . . 335
The court concluded that TMDLS must be promulgated for waters
impaired by nonpoint source pollution, but also held that EPA has no
authority to enforce load allocations on nonpoiont sources.
In Pronsolino, plaintiffs challenged TMDLs promulgated by the
EPA for the Garcia River in northern California.336 The Garcia River
suffered from excessive sediment loading, almost exclusively from
nonpoint sources, which degraded fish spawning habitat and caused a
severe decline in Coho salmon and steelhead trout populations.337
EPA s TMDL called for a sixty percent reduction in sediment loading
and allocated cleanup responsibilities among nonpoint sources in the
Garcia River watershed.338 When the Pronsolinos applied for a permit
332. Id. at 43,600-01. Citizen may bring suits against EPA only where there is alleged a
failure of [EPA] to perform any act or duty under [the CWA] which is not discretionary with
[EPA]. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (2001). See Nat l Wildlife Fed. v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (citizen suit allowable only to enforce mandatory duties ).
333. Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 10469, 10471
(Aug. 1999).
334. See HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 84; Boyd, supra note 11, at 48.
335. Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
336. EPA promulgated the TMDLs when the state of California failed to meet a deadline
for submitting the TMDLs that EPA had established in response to litigation and a consent
decree. See id. at 1340.
337. Id. at 1339.
338. Id. at 1340.
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from the California Department of Forestry (CDF) to harvest timber
on their property, the agency imposed a variety of restrictions to
prevent soil erosion, which the agency determined were necessary to
implement the EPA s TMDL. The CDF reluctantly applied the EPA s
TMDLs, concluding that to ignore them risked a loss of federal
funding.339
The court rejected the Pronsolinos argument that the TMDL
program did not apply to waters impaired solely by nonpoint source
pollution. The court noted the requirement of section 303(e)(3)(c),
which provides that TMDLs must be incorporated into a state s
continuing planning process, 340 and concluded that TMDLs were
intended to promote a comprehensive approach to state water
quality management. The court noted that excluding waterbodies
impaired by nonpoint sources from the TMDL program would
frustrate that intention.341 Similarly, the court concluded that the
language of section 303(d)(1)(A) expressly excluded from the
required list of impaired waterbodies only those that could be
redeem[ed] through the imposition of state-of-the-art technology on
point sources . . . . 342 In the court s view, [t]o have excluded the
large number of rivers and waters polluted solely by agricultural and
logging runoff would have left a chasm in the otherwise
comprehensive statutory scheme. 343
The court made clear, however, that the TMDL program s
potential to control nonpoint source pollution depends largely on the
states. Plaintiffs argued strenuously that EPA lacked authority to
339. Id.
340. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3)(C) (2001).
341. Pronsolino, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1347. (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. Fox,
909 F. Supp. 153, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). The court noted that, [i]f the TMDL . . . were to be
used only to adjust NPDES effluent limitations for point sources, then plaintiffs argument
might have force, but concluded that a broader use for TMDLs was contemplated by requiring
their inclusion in the continuing planning process. Id. at 1346.
342. Id. at 1347.
343. Id. The court also relied on dicta in other cases indicating that TMDLs were to be
fashioned for waters plagued by nonpoint source pollution, or that nonpoint sources were
subject to regulation by the states under the comprehensive planning provisions of the CWA.
See id. at 1347-49 (citing Trs. for Ala. v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1984); Or. Natural Res.
Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987); Ala. Ctr. for the Env t v.
Browner, 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994); Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517 (9th
Cir. 1995)).
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promulgate TMDLs because to do so was tantamount to authorizing
EPA to regulate state land-use practices 344 a function not
expressly authorized in the CWA and one that has traditionally been
exercised by state and local governments. The court agreed that EPA
lacked authority to regulate nonpoint sources directly by imposing
BMPs or other land use restrictions or indirectly by overriding state
choices about the extent to which nonpoint sources are to be
controlled.345 The court concluded, however, that the EPA s TMDLs
did not themselves impose such controls nor dictate a course that the
state inevitably must follow. While the state must incorporate an
EPA-promulgated TMDL into its planning processes,346 [n]othing
. . . requires that the TMDL be uncritically and mechanically passed
through to every relevant parcel of land . . . . California is also free to
moderate or to modify the TMDL reductions, or even refuse to
implement them, in light of countervailing state interests. 347
EPA may properly threaten to withhold grant money to induce a
state to enforce TMDL load allocations, but the states are free to run
the risk and ignore these allocations.348 Moreover, if a state does
knuckle under to coercive threats by EPA and implement the load
allocations, the result is not direct federal regulation. The regulation
is by [the state] though influenced by incentives established by
Congress and the agency charged with protecting the
environment. 349
In short, while EPA may promulgate TMDLs for waters that
suffer from nonpoint source pollution, and may allocate cleanup
responsibilities to nonpoint sources, that action has no direct
regulatory effect and cannot be enforced. A state may choose to adopt
the allocations and enforce them under state law, but EPA cannot
344. Pronsolino, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1355.
345. Id.
346. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). Even this conclusion is shaky since nothing in the statute
authorizes EPA to revise state plans. If a state simply refused to incorporate an EPApromulgated TMDL into its continuing planning process, EPA could take a number of actions,
such as withdrawing federal funding to state programs or de-certifying an approved state
section 402 permit program, see 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(2), but EPA is not authorized to
promulgate a federal plan to cure deficiencies in the state s plan.
347. Pronsolino, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1355.
348. Id.
349. Id.
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compel that result, nor may it enforce the allocations once they have
been made by a state. Pronsolino confirms Professor Houck s view
that, at bottom, the courts can only go so far. Indeed, under section
303(d), EPA can only go so far. At some point, through leverage,
funding and hard negotiation, the states are going to have to buy into
the program. 350 To a considerable extent, then, the TMDL
program as a regulatory program for controlling nonpoint
sources like section 208 and section 319 leads, ultimately, to a
state prerogative. 351
There are, however, considerable means available to EPA to
induce effective state control of nonpoint sources through the TMDL
program. Aside from withholding funding, as suggested in
Pronsolino, the agency may be able to use its regulatory authority to
coerce states into action. First, EPA may withdraw approval of
state authority to administer the NPDES program.352 Second, EPA
may designate certain sources that are currently unregulated under
the NPDES as point sources, subjecting them to the NPDES
regime. These sources may include unregulated AFOs, aquatic
animal production facilities, and silvicultural operations.353 As EPA
explained in its TMDL rule:
EPA could invoke this authority when necessary to provide
reasonable assurance that an EPA approved or established
TMDL would be implemented with respect to the particular
source to be designated. Moreover, EPA . . . could invoke this
authority when necessary to provide reasonable assurance that
350. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 64.
351. Id. at 60.
352. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1994) (authorizing withdrawal of state programs
[w]henever [EPA] determines . . . that a State is not administering a program approved under
this section in accordance with the requirements of this section ).
353. See TDML Rule, supra note 16, at 43646. AFOs and aquatic animal production
facilities (AAPFs) are regarded as point sources only if they are considered concentrated.
AFOs and AAPFs are deemed concentrated when they meet certain threshold requirements or
when so designated ona case-by-case basis. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.23(c), 122.24(c) (2001). The
potentially affected silviculture operations relate to storm water discharges that are currently
treated as nonpoint sources, but may physically resemble point source discharges. TDML
Rule, supra note 16, at 43650. EPA decided not to take action on silviculture operations. See id.
at 43652.
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the designated source would achieve its allocated load
reductions under the TMDL.354
In other words, if particular nonpoint sources are allocated load
reductions in a TMDL, EPA could redesignate such sources as point
sources and enforce the load allocation through the NPDES
program.355
Moreover, EPA could, under its antidegradation rules, condition
NPDES permits to new or expanding point sources on those sources
obtaining offsets reductions from existing sources (both point and
nonpoint) to ensure that existing levels of water quality are not
further degraded or to provide for reasonable progress toward
attaining water quality standards.356 This would essentially follow the
nonattainment program for new major sources under the Clean Air
Act.357 EPA proposed such changes to its NPDES rules,358 but
declined to finalize this proposal, concluding that an offset
requirement would be difficult to apply in the CWA context and that
the environmental benefits of such a requirement would likely be
minimal.359
Finally, EPA may also assert its authority to review state-issued
permits for consistency with EPA-approved TMDLs, or to ensure
water-quality-based effluent limitations are imposed when there is
not an approved TMDL in place.360
The extent to which these authorities will be exercised is, of
course, an open question. By comparison, statutes that provide EPA
354. Id.
355. Cf. Ruhl, supra note 5, at 303 (noting that EPA has suggested that states simply
declare, presumably as a matter of state law, that offending nonpoint sources are actually point
sources and require state-issued NPDES permits and full TMDL compliance ) (citing Office of
Water, E.P.A., Ensuring That TMDLs Are Implemented Reasonable Assurance, available at
http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/ensure.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
356. See Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program and
Federal Antidegradation Policy in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and
Management Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. 46058 (Aug. 23, 1999) (to be codified at 40 D.F.R. pts.
122, 123, 124 and 131) (proposing offset requirement for new and expanded sources).
357. See 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A) (2001). For suggestions of using a similar program in
the CWA, see Adler, Watershed Protection, supra note 132, at 281-84.
358. See supra note 356.
359. TDML Rule, supra note 16, at 43640-41.
360. See 40 C.F.R. § 123.44(k) (2001); see also TDML Rule, supra note 16, at 43644-46,
43652-53.
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with similar tools to induce state action, such as the Coastal Zone Act
Reauthorization Amendments nonpoint source control program,
discussed infra, and the Clean Air Act,361 do not show promising
results. Moreover, the coercive tactics that the EPA can use against
reluctant states are all discretionary sanctions. As a result, citizens
cannot compel EPA to apply such sanctions through citizen suit
litigation.362
But even assuming EPA can successfully encourage the states
to implement TMDLs, the program suffers from a fatal flaw: there is
no explicit performance standard by which to assess state TMDL
programs. To be sure, section 303(e) contemplates an iterative,
continuous planning process, under which TMDLs may be reevaluated and fine-tuned to account for shortcomings as the plans are
implemented and water quality improvements are assessed. Yet, the
states are not subject to clear deadlines or clear consequences if
TMDL implementation does not yield the desired outcomes.
Given the vast uncertainties in linking specific pollutant loadings
to actual water quality impacts, the opportunities for gaming the
system through inadequate TMDLs are very large.363 But when the
effects of this gaming become clear and water quality improvements
do not materialize, all the states are required to do, and all EPA can
demand for them to do, is to try, try again. There are simply no
meaningful incentives for states, when developing and implementing
TMDL plans, to err on the side of caution. Indeed, to the extent that
imposing enforceable control measures on farms is politically
difficult, the incentives run in precisely the opposite direction.
This overview of CWA programs confirms the view that, taken in
its entirety, the CWA the nation s primary legislative vehicle for
cleaning up our waters lacks any mandates against agricultural
nonpoint source pollution that are directly enforceable either by
361. See Williams, supra note 49, at 83-96.
362. Citizen suits against EPA under the CWA are limited to those seeking to compel EPA
to perform any act or duty . . . which is not discretionary . . . . 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (2001);
see also Nat l Wildlife Fed n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
363. For an example of the extraordinary flexibility that the EPA is granting to the states
in fashioning TMDLs, see Natural Res. Def. Council v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001)
(upholding EPA s approval of New York s TMDLs which were expressed in terms of
maximum annual loads of pollutants).
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federal authorities or affected citizens. Despite several amendments
and the renaissance of provisions once thought to be merely
hortatory, Congress has failed to adequately confront agricultural
nonpoint source pollution, continuing a longstanding solicitude to
this industry. The TMDL program presents some opportunities to
close this regulatory loophole, but it is hardly a direct approach, and
there are significant barriers to its successful implementation.
B. Other Federal Programs to Control Nonpoint Source Pollution
In addition to the CWA, several other federal programs are aimed,
directly and indirectly, at nonpoint source pollution. However, none
of these programs directly regulate agricultural practices that
contribute to nonpoint source pollution. Instead, these programs rely
on green payments or the threat of withholding federal benefits to
alter behavior that contributes to nonpoint source pollution. In this
section, I briefly discuss the Coastal Zone Management Act and
several programs administered by USDA to provide examples of
alternative ways to control nonpoint source pollution.
1. The Coastal Zone Management Act.
The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)364 bears a close
resemblance to the CWA planning programs discussed above,
particularly the section 319 nonpoint source program, with some
important exceptions. Much like section 319, the CZMA seeks to
enlist the states help in creating coastal zone management programs.
This is done by offering two basic incentives: federal financial
assistance for approved management plans365 and a federal
consistency requirement.366 Coastal zone management programs
364. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (2001).
365. Id. § 1455(a)-(c). In addition, states with approved coastal zone management plans are
eligible for federal technical assistance. See id. § 1455a(f).
366. Id. § 1456(C). Under the federal consistency requirement, subject to some important
exceptions, no [f]ederal license or permit to conduct an activity, in or outside of the coastal
zone, affecting any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone of a state with an
approved management plan may be issued if a state concludes that the action authorized by a
federal agency is inconsistent with the enforceable policies of the state s approved plan. Id.
§ 1456(c)(1)(3)(A). A similar consistency requirement applies to any plan for the exploration
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must include a number of required elements, but in general the
program must be a comprehensive statement . . . setting forth the
objectives, policies, and standards to guide public and private uses of
lands and waters in the coastal zone. 367 The management programs
are voluntary; states may freely choose not to participate in the
program. The CZMA is administered by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Agency (NOAA).368
In 1990, with enactment of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization
Amendments (CZARA), Congress created a new program (section
6217 program) to develop and implement management measures for
nonpoint source pollution to restore and protect coastal waters. 369
The section 6217 program requires all states with approved coastal
zone management plans to submit to NOAA and EPA a Coastal
Nonpoint Pollution Control Program (CNPCP).370 The CNPCP must
identify, and provide a continuing process for identifying, land uses
which, individually or cumulatively, may cause or contribute to a
degradation of coastal waters that either are failing to attain state
water quality standards or are threatened by reasonably foreseeable
increases in pollution loadings from new or expanding sources. 371 In
addition, the CNPCP must provide for implementation of
management measures conforming to guidelines issued jointly by the
EPA and NOAA.372 States were to submit their programs to NOAA
or development of, or production from, any area which has been leased under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq.) . . . with respect to any exploration,
development, or production described in such plan and affecting any land or water use or
natural resource of the coastal zone of a state. Id. § 1456(c)(3)(B); see also Exxon Corp. v.
Fischer, 807 F.2d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 1987). A weaker consistency requirement applies to other
[f]ederal agency activity and [f]ederal agency which shall undertake any development
project. These federal actions must be taken in ways that are consistent to the maximum
extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved State management programs. Id.
§§ 1456(c)(1)-(2). The term enforceable policy is defined as [s]tate policies which are
legally binding through constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, land use plans, ordinances,
or judicial or administrative decisions, by which a [s]tate exerts control over private and public
land and water uses and natural resources in the coastal zone. Id. § 1453(6a). The term coastal
zone is defined at 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1).
367. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(12).
368. See http://www.ocrm.nos.noaa.gov/czm/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
369. 16 U.S.C. § 1455b(a)(1).
370. Id.
371. Id. § 1455b(b)(1).
372. Id. § 1455b(b). Requirements governing the guidance are set forth at § 1455b(g).
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and EPA no later than thirty months after the EPA promulgates the
management measures guidance.373 Because these programs are
mandatory only for states who have approved coastal zone
management programs, any state may opt out of the requirements of
the section 6217 program simply by withdrawing from participation
in a cost-sharing coastal zone management program
Each state s CNPCP is to be implemented through changes to the
state s CWA section 319 plan and coastal zone management
program.374 Unlike section 319, CZARA mandates that each state s
coastal zone management program contain[ ] enforceable policies
and mechanisms to implement the applicable requirements of the
state s CNPCP.375 If a state fails to submit an approvable program,
NOAA and EPA are directed to withhold funding to the state under
the CZMA and section 319 of the CWA.376 As in section 319, no
provision is made for federal management programs in those states
that elect not to participate. Citizen suits are also not available to
enforce state-adopted management measures or to force EPA or
NOAA to perform nondiscretionary duties.
EPA issued guidance on management measures in 1993.377 The
guidance included management measures for agriculture, forestry,
urban areas, marinas and recreational boating, hydromodification,
and wetlands and riparian areas.378 The agricultural portion of the
guidance included measures for erosion and sediment control,
wastewater and runoff from AFOs, nutrients, pesticides, grazing, and
Management measures are defined as
economically achievable measures for the control of the addition of pollutants from
existing and new categories of nonpoint sources of pollution, which reflect the greatest
degree of pollutant reduction achievable through the application of the best available
nonpoint pollution control practices, technologies, processes, operating methods, or
other alternatives.
Id. § 1455b(g)(5).
373. Id. § 1455b(a)(1).
374. Id. §1455b(c)(2).
375. Id. § 1455(d)(16).
376. Id. § 1455b(c)(3).
377. EPA, Guidance Specifying Management Measures for Sources of Nonpoint Pollution
in Coastal Waters (1993), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/MMGI/ (last visited May
29, 2002).
378. Id.
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irrigation.379 These agencies also issued program guidance the same
year.380
Despite some high hopes from various quarters, the section 6217
program failed to live up to its potential. The states resisted the
section 6217 program with a vengeance.381 As Professor Houck
explained:
Whatever else went wrong, EPA and NOAA ran into more
than they could handle from the coastal states and their
nonpoint source constituencies. . . . As the state pressure
mounted, the federal agencies issued program clarification in
1995. Entitled Flexibility for Sate Coastal Nonpoint Programs,
it extended the time frames for state submission, presented a
range of enforceable policies and mechanisms that could be
used by states to implement their programs, and announced
[a] policy of conditional approvals . . . .382
In its final program guidance, and notwithstanding the statutory
requirement that management measures be enforceable, the
agencies concluded that states may rely on voluntary or incentivebased programs, backed by existing state enforcement authorities, if
the states satisfied certain minimal conditions.383 To date, only eight
379. Id.
380. Coastal Nonpoint Pollution State Program Guidance Documents, 58 Fed. Reg. 5182
(Jan. 19, 1993).
381. See Andrew Solomon, Section 6217 of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization
Amendments of 1990: Is There any Point?, 31 ENVTL. L. 151, 162 (2001).
382. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 102 (quoting Availability of Proposed
Administrative Changes to Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Programs Guidance, 63 Fed. Reg. 12078
(Mar. 12, 1998)).
383. Final Administrative Changes to the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program
Guidance, at 4 (1998), available at http://www.ocrm.nos.noaa.gov/czm/6217/ (last visited May
29, 2002). The conditions require the states to provide:
1. a legal opinion from the attorney general or an attorney representing the agency with
jurisdiction for enforcement that such authorities can be used to prevent nonpoint
pollution and require management measures implementation, as necessary;
2. a description of the voluntary or incentive-based programs, including the methods
for tracking and evaluating those programs, the states will use to encourage
implementation of the management measures; and
3. a description of the mechanism or process that links the implementing agency with
the enforcement agency and a commitment to use the existing enforcement authorities
where necessary.
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of the twenty-nine coastal states maintain fully approved programs,
even under the weaker requirements of the agencies final
guidance.384 Yet, states continue to receive funding for CZMA or
CWA section 319 programs despite the states failures to submit
approvable plans. The lesson here is that, [w]hen push comes to
shove, the federal environmental agencies will not be able to hold
their own without the offsetting influence of direct citizen
involvement and at least the possibility of litigation. 385
2. USDA Programs
For many years, the federal government s agricultural policy was
to shore up agricultural commodity prices to ensure a productive
national agricultural base. The government provided direct payments,
in the form of crop subsidies and land retirement programs, with
these basic policy priorities in mind. With the passage of the 1985
Farm Bill, however, the traditional emphasis on supporting
commodity prices shifted in recognition that many practices
encouraged by these policies contributed to significant environmental
degradation.386 The 1985 Farm Bill and subsequent legislation
created several new programs to promote more environmentallyfriendly agricultural practices.387
The programs fall into four basic categories: (1) compliance
requirements, which condition a farmer s continuing eligibility for
traditional agricultural subsidies on the implementation of
Id.
384. See id.
385. HOUCK, TMDL PROGRAM, supra note 16, at 104.
386. See Malone, supra note 27, at 9-12. Professor Malone attributes the shift in policy
emphasis to four factors:
the first opportunity since 1981 for a comprehensive revamping of agricultural policy;
the spiraling cost of government subsidy programs aimed at the reduction of farm
output; the growing recognition of the environmental destruction inflicted by past
agricultural policies; and, perhaps most important, the recognition by urban and
suburban interests, as well as by environmental groups, of their stake in the Farm Bill
debate.
Id. at 11.
387. See Michael R. Taylor, The Emerging Merger of Agricultural Land and
Environmental Policy: Building a Vision for the Future of American Agriculture, 20 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 169, 179-81 (2001).
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conservation plans and practices or the avoidance of land use changes
that contribute to environmental degradation; (2) technical assistance
and education programs; (3) cost-sharing programs for implementing
practice and structural changes that protect environmental values; and
(4) contract and easement programs to retire environmentally
sensitive land from agricultural production.388 While these programs
aim to alleviate a variety of environmental problems, all may address
practices that contribute to nonpoint source water pollution.
a. Compliance Programs: Sodbuster, Conservation
Compliance, and Swampbuster
Three programs, administered by USDA agencies, restrain
practices that contribute to water quality degradation and other
environmental problems. To do so, the programs condition eligibility
for traditional USDA farm subsidies on a farmer s observance of
certain conservation measures. The first two programs, Sodbuster
and the conservation compliance program, discourage agricultural
production on highly erodible lands. The third program,
Swampbuster, provides incentives to farmers to refrain from
converting wetlands to agricultural production. In general, these
programs rest on the principle that farmers who receive federal
subsidies should be required to observe practices that reduce the
adverse environmental effects of their activities, including water
quality degradation.389 A brief outline shows a limited ability for
these programs to induce lasting changes in agricultural practices that
contribute to nonpoint source pollution.
Under the Sodbuster program, the government pronounces as
ineligible for USDA benefits any farmer who produces agricultural
commodities on highly erodible land that was not in agricultural
production, or set aside from production under a USDA program,
between 1981 and 1985, unless the farmer implements a conservation
388. See U.S.D.A., ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS, 1996-7, at 255 (1977).
389. Congressional Research Service, Conservation Compliance for Agriculture: Status
and Policy Issues, Report No. 96-648 ENR (Apr. 10. 1998), available at
http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Agriculture/ag-45.cfm (last visited Apr. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter Conservation Compliance].
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plan.390 For highly erodible land that was in agricultural production
between 1981 and 1985, or that was set aside under a USDA
program, the conservation compliance program also denies benefits
unless the farmer implements a conservation plan.391 There is a subtle
difference between the treatment of Sodbuster farmers and
conservation compliance farmers. Conservation plans for farmers
subject to Sodbuster tend to be more stringent than those developed
under the conservation compliance program. The reason for this
difference in treatment rests primarily on the different economic
positions of affected farmers:
persons who break out [highly erodible] lands are in a different
position with regard to the economic consequences of
implementing the conservation requirements than are those
who have been using their land for commodity production,
since crop bases or commodity price support eligibility are not
yet established for the broken-out fields. Requiring the
conservation systems on these lands to be more stringent than
those applicable to existing cropland fields does not unfairly or
unreasonably impose an economic hardship on producers who
want to bring new land into production.392
Conservation plans are subject to approval by local conservation
officers. The relative lack of determinate criteria393 governing these
390. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-12 (2001); see also Malone, supra note 27, at 13-14.
391. Malone, supra note 27, at 13-14.
392. Malone, supra note 27, at 17 (quoting Highly Erodible Land and Wetland
Conservation: Correction, 53 Fed. Reg. 3998-3999 (1988)). In addition, farmers subject to the
conservation compliance program were given a longer, phase-in period in which to fully
implement their conservation plans. See id. at 18.
393. USDA regulations define a conservation plan as
the document that . . . [a]pplies to highly erodible cropland; . . . .[d]escribes the
conservation system applicable to the highly erodible cropland and describes the
decisions of the person with respect to location, land use, tillage systems, and
conservation treatment measures and schedules; and [i]s approved by the local soil
conservation district in consultation with the [designated] local committees . . . .
7 C.F.R. § 12.2 (2001). The USDA regulations define a conservation system as
a combination of one or more conservation measures or management practices that are
. . . [b]ased on local resource conditions, available conservation technology, and the
standards and guidelines contained in the NRCS field office technical guides . . . and
. . . [d]esigned . . . to achieve, in a cost-effective and technically practicable manner, a
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approvals allows local conservation officers to exercise considerable
discretion about the contents and practice requirements to which a
framer must conform. As Professor Malone observed, this discretion
allows agency representatives to succumb to pressure from farmers
to weaken conservation requirements. 394
Further, significant concerns arise concerning under-enforcement
of the conservation compliance program. Cultural issues may
contribute to this problem, as the USDA agencies charged with
enforcing the programs traditionally view their job as assisting
farmers, not as regulating their activities.395 As of 1996, 3,875
farmers neglected to comply with the conservation compliance and
Sodbuster programs, resulting in a loss of benefits of $15.5 million.396
Compared to the billions of dollars in USDA benefits disbursed in the
same period,397 this sum appears rather paltry.
In addition, these statistics fail to reflect changes made in these
programs by the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act
of 1996 (FAIR), which introduced a considerable amount of
flexibility into these programs. Some examples of this flexibility
include: allowing violators up to one year to meet compliance
requirements before benefits are withheld; expediting variances for
weather, pest, or disease problems; permitting farmers to selfcertify compliance when applying for benefits; allowing farmers to
modify their conservation plans; allowing county committees to grant
relief to farmers suffering undue economic hardship ; and deleting
crop insurance from the list of program benefits that can be denied.398
The Swampbuster program is similar to the Sodbuster program,
substantial reduction in soil erosion or a substantial improvement in soil conditions on
a field or group of fields containing highly erodible cropland when compared to the
level of erosion or soil conditions that existed before the application of the
conservation measures and management practices.
Id.
394. Malone, supra note 27, at 18.
395. See Conservation Compliance, supra note 389; see also General Accounting Office,
Soil and Wetlands Conservation: Soil Conservation Service Making Good Progress but
Cultural Issues Need Attention, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=rc94241.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao
(last visited Sept. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Soil and Wetlands Conservation].
396. Conservation Compliance, supra note 389.
397. Id.
398. Id.
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but specifically targets conversions of wetlands to agricultural
production. In the 1985 Farm Bill, Swampbuster denied USDA
benefits to any person who in any crop year produces an agricultural
commodity on converted wetland. 399 Ineligibility for such benefits
was limited to the crop year in which converted wetlands yielded
agricultural commodities.400 In 1990, Congress concluded that this
limited basis for denying USDA benefits did not adequately
discourage inappropriate agricultural uses of valuable wetlands.401
Accordingly, Congress extended ineligibility to any person who in
any crop year beginning after [November 28, 1990], converts a
wetland by draining, dredging, filling, leveling, or any other means
for the purpose, or to have the effect, of making the production of an
agricultural commodity possible on such converted wetland. 402
Further, Congress extended the period of ineligibility for persons
engaging in such activities to include all subsequent crop years. 403
FAIR introduced a number of measures designed to introduce
greater flexibility into the Swampbuster programs. Farmers who
converted wetlands for agricultural production are no longer
classified as automatically ineligible for USDA program benefits.
Instead, FAIR created a provision for graduated sanctions and good
faith exceptions. Upon a finding that a farmer engaged in practices
that render the farmer ineligible for benefits, the graduated sanctions
approach permits the USDA to reduce benefits in an amount
399. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, Title XII, Subtitle C, § 1221, 99 Stat.
1507.
400. Id.
401. S. REP. NO. 101-357, at 236 (1990), The legislative history of the 1990 amendments
identified the deficiencies of the 1985 Act:
[Under the 1985 Act ] a person may drain a wetland and not be in violation of
swampbuster until the person produces an agricultural commodity on that land.
Therefore, a person can produce on the converted wetland during a time of high
commodity prices and stay out of the production adjustment programs. During a year
of low commodity prices, the person can simply not produce on the converted wetland
and regain eligibility for farm program benefits. The functional value of the wetland,
however, is lost as long as it is converted.
Id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4890.
402. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, Title
XIV, Subtitle B, § 1421(b), 104 Stat. 3572.
403. Id.
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determined . . . to be proportionate to the severity of the violation. 404
The good faith exemption waives ineligibility if the person acted in
good faith and without intent to violate the conditions governing
eligibility and agrees to implement a mitigation plan.405 FAIR also
enabled ineligible farmers to regain eligibility for program benefits
by implementing approved mitigation projects.406 Because these
avenues of escape from program ineligibility lie largely within the
discretion of USDA agencies, they will most likely be interpreted to
favor farmers. As noted above with the Sodbuster program, these
agencies traditionally act with reluctance as regulators towards
their constituent farmers.407
The methods used by compliance programs, such as Sodbuster
and Swampbuster present serious drawbacks in addition to those
previously identified. First, if the cost of compliance is high, the
threat of losing some USDA benefits may not provide sufficient
incentives to induce compliance. Consequently, farmers may opt out
of the USDA farm program as conservation measures become stricter
or more costly.408 Second, as commodity price supports are phased
out in upcoming years, the incentives for conservation practices will

404. 16 U.S.C. § 3821(a)(2) (2001). Additionally, the 1996 amendments permit the
Secretary of Agriculture to determine which, if any, of the various benefits may be withheld in
response to restricted activities. See 16 U.S.C. § 3821(b). Prior to the 1996 amendments,
graduated sanctions based on the severity of the violation were available only if the violation
was found to have been committed inadvertently by a person acting in good faith and only if
that person was actively restoring the wetland functions and values that were lost as a result of
the violation. See Act of Nov. 28, 1990, P.L. 101-624, Title XIV, Subtitle B, § 1422, 104 Stat.
3573.
405. 7 C.F.R. § 12.5(b)(5)(i) (2001).
406. Id. § 12.5(b)(4); see also 16 U.S.C. § 3822(i):
Any person who is determined to be ineligible for program benefits . . . for any crop
year shall not be ineligible for such program benefits . . . for any subsequent crop year
if, prior to the beginning of such subsequent crop year, the person has fully restored
the characteristics of the converted wetland to its prior wetland state or has otherwise
adequately mitigated for the loss of wetland values . . . .
407. Soil and Wetland Conservation, supra note 396, at 7 (noting underreporting of
violations to avoid citing farmers for violations.).
408. See J. Walker et al., The Efficiency and Effectiveness of Conservation Compliance
under 1996 Farm Commodity Policy Reforms, 55 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 447
(2000).
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simply erode.409 Finally, controlling erosion and wetland conversions
is only a small part of the totality of agricultural practices that
contribute to nonpoint source pollution. Moreover, many of the most
damaging practices such as animal waste management take place
on farms that do not participate in USDA benefit programs; [t]he
programs have no hold over landholders who do not grow program
crops or are prepared to forego program benefits. 410 Thus, even if
these compliance programs worked effectively and there is
considerable evidence that they do not411 they would be much less
than what is needed to make an effective response to agricultural
nonpoint source pollution.412
b. Land Retirement and Cost-Sharing Programs
In addition to Swampbuster and Sodbuster, USDA administers a
variety of programs that offer technical and financial assistance to
farmers. Many of these address practices that contribute to nonpoint
source pollution. The three major programs are the Wetland Reserve
Program, the Conservation Reserve Program, and the Environmental
Quality Incentives Program. These programs fall under an umbrella
statutory program enacted in 1990 and reauthorized by the 1996 Farm
Bill entitled, the Environmental Conservation Acreage Program
(ECARP).413
Congress instructed USDA to establish and maintain ECARP for
calendar years 1996 through 2002. A significant split of opinion
exists within Congress regarding reauthorization of these plans both
on the need for change and the appropriate level of funding for
existing programs.414 The general ECARP program authorizes USDA
409. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 67-68
(1997); CLAASSEN ET AL., AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS: GUIDEPOSTS
ON A CHANGING LANDSCAPE, U.S.D.A. Agricultural Economic Rep. No. 794, at 12 (2001),
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer794/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
410. David Farrier, Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management
or Compensation for Lost Expectations, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 341 (1995); see
CLAASSEN ET AL., supra note 409, at 12.
411. See General Accounting Office, Soil and Wetland Conservation, supra note 199, at 7;
Farrier, supra note 410, at 341.
412. Farrier, supra note 410, at 341.
413. 16 U.S.C. § 3830(a)(3) (2001): see Malone, supra note 27, at 19 (1993).
414. See Congressional Research Service, Report No. RL31185, The 2002 Farm Bill:
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to employ a variety of financial incentives to the agricultural
community to promote conservation practices. In particular, Congress
directed USDA to implement ECARP through contracts and the
acquisition of easements to assist owners and operators of farms and
ranches to conserve and enhance soil, water, and related natural
resources, including grazing land, wetland, and wildlife habitat. 415
The general provisions of ECARP authorize USDA to designate
conservation priority areas in which agricultural producers are
eligible for enhanced assistance to comply with federal and State
environmental law.416 Such enhanced assistance is to be based on (1)
the significance of the soil, water, wildlife habitat, and related
natural resource problems in a watershed, multistate area, or region ;
or (2) the structural practices or land management practices that best
address the problems, and that maximize environmental benefits for
each dollar expended[.] 417
i. Wetland Reserve Program
The Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) authorizes USDA to
purchase conservation easements from and enter into cost-sharing
agreements with farmers to restore and protect wetlands.418 The WRP
primarily targets farmed wetlands that can likely be restored in a
Overview and Status, at 31 (Feb. 4, 2002), available at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRS/
abstract.cfm?NLEid=21987.
415. 16 U.S.C. § 3830(a)(1).
416. 16 U.S.C. § 3830(c)(1)-(2).
417. 16 U.S.C. § 3830(c)(3).
418. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3837-3837f. USDA regulations provide this brief description of the
WRP:
Under the WRP, [USDA] will purchase conservation easements from, or enter into
restoration cost-share agreements with, eligible landowners who voluntarily cooperate
in the restoration and protection of wetlands and associated lands. To particpate in
WRP, a landowner will agree to the implementation of a Wetlands Reserve Plan of
Operations (WRPO), the effect of which is to restore, protect, enhance, maintain, and
manage the hydrologic conditions of inundation or saturation of the soil, native
vegetation, and natural topography of eligible lands. [USDA] may provide cost-share
assistance for the activities that promote the restoration, protection, enhancement,
maintenance, and management of wetland functions and values. Specific restoration,
protection, enhancement, maintenance, and management functions may be undertaken
by the landowner or other [USDA] designee.
7 C.F.R. § 1467.4(a) (2001).
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cost-effective manner, are capable of providing wildlife benefits and
wetland values and functions, and would otherwise continue to be
devoted to agricultural production.419 The WRP is administered by
NRCS.
The owner s granting of an easement to the United States enrolls
land into the WRP. The easements are permanent or for a term of
thirty years420 and must provide for the implementation of a Wetland
Reserve Plan of Operations (WRPO).421 The WRPO specifies the
actions required to restore and protect wetlands within the easement
area. Landowners develop these WRPOs through the NRCS in
consultation with other agencies.422 Landowners receive
compensation for the easements and may receive cost-sharing
assistance in implementing the WRPO to the extent that [such] cost
sharing is appropriate and in the public interest[.] 423 The statue also
authorizes USDA to enroll land into the WRP without obtaining an
easement through cost-share agreements with landowners who agree
419. See 16 U.S.C. § 3837(c); 7 C.F.R. § 1467.4(d). Eligible lands include: wetlands
farmed under natural conditions; farmed wetlands; prior converted cropland; farmed wetland
pasture; farmland that has become a wetland as a result of flooding; rangeland, pasture, or
production forestland where the hydrology has been significantly degraded and can be restored;
riparian areas which link protected wetlands; lands adjacent to protected wetlands that
contribute significantly to wetland functions and values; and previously restored wetlands. See
USDA, Natural Resources Conservation Service, Fact Sheet, Wetlands Reserve Program,
available at http://www.nhq.nrcs.usda.gov/CCS/FB96OPA/WRPfact.html last visited (Mar. 15,
2002). Ineligible lands include: wetlands converted after December 23, 1985 (and thus subject
to Swampbuster); lands containing timber or trees under a Conservation Reserve Program
contract (discussed below); lands owned by an agency of the United States; lands subject to an
easement or deed restriction prohibiting agricultural production for a duration of thirty or more
years; and lands where restoration activities would be futile. Id.
420. 16 U.S.C. § 3837a(e)(2). The WRP is subject to a total acreage cap of 975,000 acres.
Id. § 3837(b)(1). Additionally, beginning as of October 1, 1996, the Act requires USDA, to the
maximum extent practicable, to enroll lands in the following ways: (1) one-third of the acres
through use of permanent easements; (2) one-third of the acres through use of thirty-year (nonpermanent) easements; and (3) one-third of the acres through use of restoration cost-share
agreements. Id. § 3837(b)(2)(A).
421. 7 C.F.R § 1467.10(a); see 16 U.S.C. § 3837a(b).
422. 7 C.F.R. § 1467.11.
423. 16 U.S.C. § 3837c(a)(1). For permanent easements, cost-share payments may not be
less than seventy-five nor more than one hundred percent of the costs; for non-permanent
easements, such payments may not be less than fifty nor more than seventy-four percent of
implementation costs. 7 C.F.R. § 1467.9. USDA also directs necessary technical assistance to
assist owners in complying with the terms and conditions of the easement and the [WRPO]. 16
U.S.C. § 3837c(a)(2).
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to restore wetlands on their land.424 A landowner who violates the
terms of an easement or contract with USDA is liable for any costs
incurred by the NRCS in remedying the violation, including all
administrative and legal costs.425
ii. Conservation Reserve Program
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) seeks to costeffectively assist owners and operators in conserving and improving
soil, water, and wildlife resources by converting highly erodible and
other environmentally sensitive acreage normally devoted to the
production of agricultural commodities to a long-term, resourceconserving cover. 426 Acting through the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) and the Farm Service Agency (FSA), USDA
enters into agreements with persons to retire eligible land from
production and convert the land to a conserving use under the terms
of an approved conservation plan.427 The agreements must be for a
period of not less than ten nor more than fifteen years.428 The total
acreage that may be enrolled in the CRP is capped at 36.4 million
acres.
The CRP primarily applies to agricultural lands that pose on-site
or off-site environmental problems. Participants enroll in the CRP by
entering into a contract with CCC that includes the terms and
conditions for participation, a conservation plan, and any other
materials or agreements CCC determines to be necessary.429 A
conservation plan is a record of the participant s decisions, and
supporting information, for treatment of a unit of land or water, and
includes a schedule of operations, activities, and estimated
expenditures needed to solve identified natural resource problems by
devoting eligible land to permanent vegetative cover, trees, water, or
424. 16 U.S.C. § 3837a(h).
425. 7 C.F.R. § 1467.14.
426. Conservation Reserve Program Long-Term Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. 7602, 7604 (Feb.
19, 1997); see 7 C.F.R. § 1410.3(c).
427. 7 C.F.R. § 1410.3.
428. Id.
429. Id. § 1410.32.
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other comparable measures. 430 The participant is required to
implement the conservation plan and forego using the land for
grazing, harvesting, or other commercial use of crops, unless
approved by CCC.431 In return, CRP participants receive annual
rental payments, not to exceed $50,000 per year. Participants may
also receive cost-share assistance to establish the practices in the
conservation plan, subject to a limitation of fifty percent of the actual
or average costs.432
The initial administration of the CRP was criticized, in part,
because the acreage enrolled did not represent a broad range of
environmentally sensitive land, but tended to be the product of the
lowest bids offered by farmers, screened only by minimal acceptance
criteria.433 In addition, the CRP represented to many farmers an
opportunity to retire unprofitable acreage, regardless whether such
retirement promised significant environmental benefits. In many
cases, farmers treated the program as essentially a continuation of
prior policies that aimed to limit production rather than preserve
environmentally sensitive land. As Professor Malone notes,
implementation of the new program [was hampered] due to
administrative attempts to serve the conflicting objectives of supply
control and conservation. 434 In addition, many policy makers saw
programs like the CRP as a way to offset losses in farm support
occasioned by reduced funding for traditional crop subsidy programs
and preferred to provide conservation funds and programs more
evenly to crop producers across the country[,] rather than target
conservation funding at practices and lands with the greatest potential
for water quality or other environmental improvements.435
USDA regulations provide that contract offers will be evaluated
by employing different factors, as determined by CCC [that] may be
430. Id. § 1410.2
431. Id. § 1410. 20.
432. Id. §§ 1410.21, 1410.41(a), 1410.42(c).
433. See General Accounting Office, Conservation Reserve Program: Alternatives Are
Available for Managing Environmentally Sensitive Cropland, Report No GAO/RCED-95-42, at
13 (Feb. 1995) [hereinafter Conservation Reserve Program].
434. Malone, supra note 27, at 12.
435. Congressional Research Service, Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP):
Status and Issues, Report No. 96-881 ENR (Nov. 1, 1996), available at
http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Agriculture/ag-74.cfm [hereinafter EQIP Report].
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considered from time to time for priority purposes to accomplish the
goals of the program. 436 After the CRP was reauthorized and
amended to include a focus on water quality issues, FSA began in
1991 to use an Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) to evaluate,
score, and rank contract proposals.437 The EBI assigns points to the
practices included in a contract proposal based on a number of
factors, including wildlife benefits, water quality benefits, erosion
benefits, enduring benefits, air quality benefits, benefits to
conservation priority areas, and cost.438 A 1995 report by the General
Accounting Office nonetheless concluded that, the CRP could have
provided more environmental benefits for the same amount of federal
expenditure if USDA had emphasized the program s water quality
goals . . . [The] USDA focused primarily on meeting mandated
acreage goals that were established for each signup, to the detriment
of the program s environmental goals. 439
As part of the Clinton Administration s Clean Water Action Plan,
USDA pursued a number of new initiatives under the CRP.440 One is
436. 7 C.F.R. § 1410.31(b). The regulations list the following factors that may be
considered: soil erosion; water quality; wildlife benefits; conservation priority area
designations; likelihood that enrolled land will remain in conserving uses; air quality; and cost
of enrolling acreage in the CRP. Id.
437. Congressional Research Service, Report No. 97-673, Conservation Reserve Program:
Status and Current Issues, at 2 (May 8, 2001) [hereinafter Status and Current Issues]. USDA
amended its regulations governing the manner in which lands would be prioritized in 1997, but
still employs EBI rankings. See Conservation Reserve Program Long-Term Policy, 62 Fed.
Reg. 7602 (Feb. 19, 1997); Status and Current Issues, supra, at 3. For a detailed history of the
CRP and the effects of amendments, see Malone, supra note 27, at 24-33.
438. General Accounting Office, Conservation Reserve Program, supra note 433, at 14. A
description of the EBI is contained in Farm Service Agency, Fact Sheet, Conservation Reserve
Program Sign-Up 20, Environmental Benefits Index (Sept. 1999), available at
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/ebiold.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
439. General Accounting Office, Conservation Reserve Program, supra note 433, at 18.
440. The CWAP set forth these key actions for USDA in its administration of the CRP:
(1) establish two million miles of conservation buffers on agricultural lands to prevent
pollution and help meet water quality goals ; (2) reserve four million acres from the
Conservation Reserve Program for the establishment of conservation buffers ;(3) pursue
partnerships with the private sector, farm and conservation organizations, and states, tribes, and
federal agencies to develop a coordinated campaign to encourage landowners to put
conservation buffers on their farms and ranches ; (4) issue a Federal Register notice by early
1998 announcing the availability of the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP)
and providing programmatic and administrative guidance to states for submitting proposals for
CREP agreements ; and (5) work with states to help develop proposals leading to as many
CREP agreements as practicable to address critical water quality, soil erosion, and fish and
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known as the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP).
This is a joint federal-state program that uses CRP and state funding
to develop and implement comprehensive plans that address
significant environmental problems.441 The program is voluntary for
farmers. To date, twenty-one state proposals have been accepted,
while eight more state proposals are pending review.442 From 1998 to
2002, over 17,300 contracts covering nearly 290,000 acres have been
enrolled in this program at a cost of over $55,000,000.443
An example of a CREP program is Maryland s program to
provide greater protection for the Chesapeake Bay watershed, which
was the first program to be approved.444 The program calls for
enrolling 100,000 acres in the CRP to provide stream buffers, restore
wetlands, and reduce sediment from highly erodible land.445 The cost
of Maryland s program is $195 million, of which $170 million is
provided by CRP federal funds.446 In explaining how the Maryland
CREP program differs from more routine CRP matters, USDA noted
that the program: (1) coordinates CRP with goals and funding
established by the state; (2) applies only to land in Maryland; (3)
restricts eligibility to riparian buffers, highly erodible land, and
wetland restoration; (4) provides a higher incentive rate to enroll
lands to protect the Chesapeake Bay; and (5) provides supplemental
state funding for conservation practices and easements.447
A second initiative involves the National Conservation Buffer
Initiative, which has a stated goal of installing two million miles of
wildlife habitat needs, including those for threatened and endangered species. CLEAN WATER
ACTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 48-49.
441. See Solicitation of Proposals for the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program, 63
Fed. Reg. 28965 (May 27, 1998); Environmental Defense Fund, Suggestions to States
Interested in Developing Conservation Reserve Enhancement Programs (Mar. 1998), available
at http://www.fb-net.org/CREP-EDF.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002).
442. See http://www.fsa.usda.gov/dafp/cepd/stateupdates.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).
443. See http://www.fsa.usda.gov/crpstorpt/12approved/r7crepyr/us.htm (last visited Mar.
13, 2002).
444. Soil and Conservation Issues, supra note 199, at 4; see also USDA, Questions &
Answers: Conservation Reserve Program Maryland State Enhancement Program, at 1 (Oct.
1997),
available
at
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/html/mderep.htm.
[hereinafter Maryland Program ].
445. See Soil and Conservation Issues, supra note 199, at 4.
446. Id.
447. Maryland Program, supra note 444, at 2.
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conservation buffers by 2002.448 Conservation buffers are small strips
of land that are strategically placed in the landscape to intercept
pollutant runoff and mitigate sediment, nutrient, and pesticide
movements from farm fields to waterbodies.449 Included are riparian
buffers, filter strips, grassed waterways, shelterbelts, windbreaks,
living snow fences, contour grass strips, cross-wind trap strips,
shallow water areas for wildlife, field borders, alley cropping,
herbaceous wind barriers, and vegetative barriers.450 The program
offers financial incentives, in the form of cost-sharing arrangements,
to farmers who agree to install conservation buffers.451
The program was initiated in 1997, but in April 2000, USDA
began offering more incentives to attract greater participation,
including signing bonuses, increased cost-share payments for cover
crops and buffer maintenance, and increased payments for
pastures.452 The buffer initiative is funded through a variety of USDA
programs, including the Wetlands Reserve Program and the
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (discussed infra), but the
vast majority of funds are provided by the CRP.453 To date, 1,200,000
miles of buffer strips have been installed under the initiative.454
The CRP has undoubtedly yielded significant environmental
benefits, but its current annual costs of $1.7 billion represent nearly
half of all federal conservation spending.455 At the end of fiscal year
2000, the program supported active contracts on 31.5 million acres.456
While farmers interest in the program currently remains very high, it
448. Natural Resources Conservation Service, Buffer Strips: Common Sense Conservation,
available at http://www.nhq.nrcs.usda.gov/CCS/bufgoal.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2002)
[hereinafter Buffer Strips ].
449. Id.
450. Id.; see also SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION SOCIETY, REALIZING THE PROMISE OF
CONSERVATION BUFFER TECHNOLOGY 9 (2001), available at http://www.swcs.org/docs/
proto.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).
451. Buffer Strips, supra note 448.
452. See National Association of Conservation Districts, USDA Announces New Buffer
Incentives, BUFFER NOTES (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.nacdnet.org/buffers/00Apr/
ccrp.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2002); Soil and Conservation Issues, supra note 199, at 4.
453. See National Association of Conservation Districts, Progress Toward the Two Million
Mile Goal, BUFFER NOTES (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.nacdnet.org/buffers/index.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2002).
454. Id.
455. Status and Current Issues, supra note 437, at 5.
456. Id. at 4.
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is widely feared that when the current contracts expire and a large
number will expire in 2002 farmers will not maintain the
conservation practices without further subsidies.457 After a CRP
contract expires, federal payments cease, and producers are under no
obligation to maintain the conservation values established under the
contract ; accordingly, the benefits of the program can properly only
be regarded as temporary.458
Additionally, when cropland is taken out of production under the
CRP, farmers face incentives to open previously untilled land to
agricultural production. It is has been estimated that for every one
hundred acres of cropland taken out of production in the central
United States under the CRP, twenty acres of previously uncropped
land has been placed into crop production.459 While the character of
the lands involved or the environmental effects of placing them in
production are not known, it is highly likely that this increased
production will have discernible, negative impacts on water quality.
To some extent, this problem, and the problem raised by expiring
contract terms, is obviated by the conservation compliance program
and Sodbuster, which place farmers who open highly erodible land to
production at risk of becoming ineligible for USDA program
benefits.460
iii. The Environmental Quality Incentives Program
The last program included within the Environmental Conservation
Acreage Reserve Program is the Environmental Quality Incentives
Program (EQIP). EQIP consolidates into a single program the
functions of a number of conservation programs that were repealed in
1996.461 The purposes of EQIP are to provide, in a cost-effective way,
technical, financial, and educational assistance to farmers and
ranchers (1) who face the most serious threats to soil, water, and
related natural resources, including grazing lands, wetlands, and
457. Id.
458. Id. at 5.
459. JunJie Wu et al., Targeting Resource Conservation Expenditures, 15 CHOICES: THE
MAG. OF FOOD, FARM AND RES. ISSUES 33 (June 22, 2000).
460. Id.; see Conservation Reserve Program, supra note 433, at 38.
461. See 16 U.S.C. § 3839aa(1) (2001).
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wildlife habitats ; (2) to comply with federal and state environmental
laws; and (3) in making beneficial, cost-effective changes . . . or
other measures needed to conserve and improve soil, water, and
related natural resources. 462 EQIP is jointly administered by NRCS,
FSA, and CCC, with NRCS designated as the lead agency.463
EQIP authorizes USDA to enter into contracts with eligible
persons to provide cost-share assistance and incentive payments to
farmers and ranchers who agree to implement land management
practices and structural practices. 464 Land management practices
are defined as site specific nutrient or manure management,
integrated pest management, irrigation management, tillage or
residue management, grazing management, or other land
management practice carried out on eligible land that [USDA]
determines is needed to protect, in the most cost-effective manner,
water, soil, or related resources from degradation. 465 A structural
practice means:
the establishment on eligible land of a site-specific animal
waste management facility, terrace, grassed waterway, contour
grass strip, filterstrip, tailwater pit, permanent wildlife habitat,
or other structural practice that [USDA] determines is needed
to protect, in the most cost-effective manner, water, soil, or
related natural resources from degradation; and . . . the capping
of abandoned wells on eligible land. 466
These practices are to be included in a conservation plan that is
acceptable to NRCS and approved by a local conservation district.467
Applications for participation in EQIP are scored according to
ranking system developed by NRCS. This system considers the
environmental benefits per dollar expended, a reasonable estimate of
the cost of the conservation practices, payments to the applicant, and
other factors for determining which applications will impose the least
462. Id. § 3839aa(2). Half of the funding for EQIP is targeted to persons who experience
livestock-related environmental problems, such as waste management. 7 C.F.R. § 1466.4(e).
463. 7 C.F.R. § 1466.2 (2001).
464. 16 U.S.C. § 3839aa.
465. Id. § 3839aa-1(2).
466. 16 U.S.C. § 3839aa-1(5).
467. 7 C.F.R. § 1466.6(a).
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costs on the program; the environmental benefits resulting from
implementation of the conservation plan; the extent to which the
contract will assist the applicant in complying with applicable
environmental laws; and whether the land is in a priority area and the
extent to which the contract will further priority area goals and
objectives.468 Priority areas are determined through a process that
begins with local work groups composed of USDA representatives
and state and local officials.469
EQIP contracts must be for a duration of not less five nor more
than ten years. The contract incorporates a conservation plan that
details the specific management practice(s) that the participant will
implement.470 Participants receive cost-share assistance and incentive
payments in an amount and at a rate necessary to encourage a
participant to perform the land management practice that would not
otherwise be initiated without government assistance. 471
All of the USDA programs discussed can, and undoubtedly have,
produced some reductions in agricultural nonpoint source pollution.
However, even when combined, these voluntary programs have
failed to make significant progress in controlling such pollution.
Some of the reasons for this failure have been discussed, but there are
two overarching shortcomings with these programs. First, the
incentives these programs offer to farmers are largely at the mercy of
commodity prices. If farmers can increase profits by expanding
production rather than maintaining conservation practices, they will
do so. As a consequence, there remains a great deal of confusion
about whether these programs are conservation programs or just an
additional effort to shore up commodity prices. As Professor Ruhl
has noted, [e]vidence suggests that farmer participation in the green
payments programs is highly sensitive to market commodity prices
and does not reflect any newly found farm stewardship ethic.
468. Id. § 1466.20(f).
469. See Environmental Quality Incentives Program, 62 Fed. Reg. 28258, 28266-71 (May
22, 1997); EQIP Report, supra note 435.
470. 7 C.F.R. § 1466.21(b).
471. Id. §§ 1466.23(a)(1),(2). Cost-share assistance may not exceed seventy-five percent of
the projected cost of establishing a structural practice. Participants may receive both cost-share
assistance and incentive payments, subject to a total limitation of $10,000 for any fiscal year
and $50,000 for any multi-year contract. Id. §§ 1466.23(a)(4), (b)(1)(2).
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Farmers, like most of us, follow the money. 472
Second, the expenditures necessary to induce sufficient
participation in these programs in order to have a significant impact
on water quality nationally are quite large. Not only must initial
funding be extensive enough to enroll a critical mass of volunteer
farmers, but this large level of funding must be sustained over time.
This will ensure that once conservation practices are implemented
they will remain in place. Funding for these programs is derived from
annual appropriations process, and accordingly, will be subject to
ordinary fiscal pressures. It would be naive to believe that continuous
and generous funding of these programs will be sustained.
III. RESTRUCTURING FEDERAL LAW TO ADDRESS AGRICULTURAL
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION
From the foregoing review of existing federal programs, it is
apparent that an effective response to agricultural nonpoint source
pollution requires a significant restructuring of existing federal
authority. The major shortcomings of the existing amalgam of
programs are: (1) the absence of an effective institutional structure to
ensure consistent and defensible monitoring and assessment of water
quality; (2) an over-reliance on voluntary, incentive-based
programs to achieve needed pollution reductions; and relatedly (3)
the absence of control measures on farms that can be enforced by
federal authorities or by affected citizens. Some of these problems
could be cured in part through significant, but not far-reaching, policy
amendments. An effective overall policy for controlling agricultural
nonpoint pollution will, however, require more sweeping reforms. In
this section, I propose both.
A. Minimum National Water Quality and Monitoring Standards
The present system of water quality standards and monitoring and
assessment of water bodies creates a number of problems.
Inconsistencies from state to state can create confusion among
472. Ruhl, supra note 5, at 326 (citing Tina Adler, Prairie Tales, 149 SCI. NEWS 44, 45
(1996)).
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affected populations and, in some cases, particularly in interstate
waters, lead to serious inequities in the allocation of cleanup
responsibilities. In addition, the absence of effective monitoring and
assessment permits farmers and others to point fingers of blame at
others for perceived water quality problems. A fairly straightforward
remedy for these problems would be the enactment of pre-emptive,
minimum federal water quality standards with monitoring and
modeling protocols.473
For conventional water pollutants, the EPA could promulgate a
menu of water quality criteria corresponding to various acceptable
designated uses in various regions and in various types of water
bodies. To some extent, the EPA s existing criteria guidelines already
provide a menu of this type.474 States would retain authority to
designate uses, but would be required to adopt the EPA s criteria.
Similarly, the EPA could establish monitoring and assessment
protocols that the states would be required to follow. States that fail
to adopt appropriate water quality standards and monitoring and
assessment protocols would face loss of federal funds. The EPA
would be required to fill the gap with federal standards.
Minimum federal standards would ensure greater consistency
among states, which is a pressing need, particularly in interstate
waters.475 The need for consistency will likely increase as
implementation of the TMDL program accelerates. Minimum federal
standards would prevent the states from yielding to the temptation of
adopt the least protective standards in an effort to avoid the
regulatory and economic impacts of the TMDL program
requirements. As Professor Adler argues, with federal standards, all
waters in the country would be measured against a uniform
benchmark, and TMDLs would be required wherever statutory and
regulatory minima were exceeded. 476
In addition, binding national standards would yield significant
473. See Wagner, supra note 21, at 463 ( EPA could establish mandatory minimum
national water quality standards or at least standard methods for determining degradation for the
most serious pollutants. ).
474. See, e.g., Nutrient Criteria Development; Notice of Ecoregional Nutrient Criteria, 66
Fed. Reg. 1671 (Jan. 9, 2001).
475. Wagner, supra note 21, at 463-64.
476. Adler, supra note 2, at 256.
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savings in administrative costs due to economies of scale.477 Under
the current statutory program, states are required to revise water
quality standards every three years, and the EPA must oversee these
revisions.478 While the task of promulgating the variety of standards
necessary to make a system of minimum national standards workable
is daunting, it pales in comparison to the current workload the EPA
faces.
Minimum national standards may, somewhat paradoxically, also
enhance citizen participation. Professor Wagner notes the obvious
handicap that the diffused citizenry encounters in participating in
state-wide issues that appear largely technical in nature, a
handicap made even more serious when state processes are
dominated by [s]pecial interest groups representing industry, water
suppliers, and agriculture. 479 In addition, the process of establishing
designated uses, or water quality goals, could, with national water
quality standards, proceed in a fashion that more clearly informs
interested citizens of the economic and social implications of the
choices they face. Water quality criteria and monitoring and
assessment protocols would be promulgated and binding prior to and
independent of the selection of use designations. As a consequence,
the opportunities to game the system by selecting weak criteria or
lax monitoring and assessment techniques would be reduced, if not
eliminated.480 Citizens could, as a consequence, have greater
assurance that the control measures they are willing to accept will
likely yield the desired levels of water quality. This will lead to more
informed and more widely endorsed choices. As a result, national
standards will tend to promote the legitimacy of water quality
programs as a whole.
A final advantage to nationally uniform standards and assessment
protocols is that they will help develop consistent and defensible
477. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 570, 614-15 (1996).
478. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2001).
479. Wagner, supra note 21, at 463-64 & n.120 (quoting NATIONAL WILDLIFE
FEDERATION, SAVING OUR WATERSHEDS: A FIELD GUIDE TO WATERSHED RESTORATION
USING TMDLS 24 (1998)).
480. On the ways in which the current program permits gaming, see Adler, supra note 2,
at 293.

2002]

When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail

115

techniques for identifying the sources responsible for water quality
impairments, including agricultural nonpoint sources. In the current
framework, it is simply too easy to manipulate assessment and
monitoring techniques to reach conclusions that are politically, if not
environmentally, acceptable. Farmers can rest confident in
maintaining unsustainable practices by the sheer lack of evidence
linking their practices with resulting water quality impairments.
There is some evidence, however, that if farmers are convinced that
their practices are responsible for water pollution both on and off the
farm, they are much more willing to adopt conservation practices.481
Consistent approaches to establishing the connection between farm
practices and resulting water quality impairments may thus provide
avenues for breaking down farmers resistance to implementing new
management practices.
B. Strengthening the Institutional Structure of the TMDL Program
Within the CWA s TMDL program lies the seeds of an
institutional structure for reforming federal and state programs for
controlling agricultural nonpoint source pollution. The principal
shortcoming of the current program is the absence of enforceable
controls on nonpoint sources. The strength of the program is its
emphasis on developing watershed-based approaches to improving
water quality by allocating cleanup responsibilities among point and
nonpoint sources.
In addition to Professor Adler s pioneering ideas,482 there are
important lessons from the Clean Air Act that can be applied to the
TMDL program to create a more effective response to agricultural
nonpoint source pollution. First, explicit authority should be
conferred on the EPA to designate watershed planning areas that
would geographically define the appropriate unit for water quality
plan development and implementation. Such watershed planning
areas would be functionally analogous to the Clean Air Act s air
481. See Laura M. J. McCann & K. William Easter, Differences Between Farmer and
Agency Attitudes Regarding Policies to Reduce Phosphorus Pollution in the Minnesota River
Basin, 21 REV. AGRICULTURAL ECON. 189 (1999).
482. See Adler, supra note 2.
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quality control regions. 483 Based on the TMDL reporting
requirements concerning listings of impaired waters, the watershed
planning areas could be designated as
attainment
or
nonattainment areas.
To avoid the notorious problems associated with the Clean Air
Act s state implementation plan development and approval
process,484 the state level development of SIPs to meet water quality
standards should simply be bypassed in favor of a single, broadly
participatory process resulting in an enforceable federal water quality
plan. Plan implementation could be delegated to state agencies, but
the plan itself must include control measures that are enforceable by
federal authorities and affected citizens through citizen suits.
Plan development and implementation would not, however,
simply replicate the federal implementation plan process under the
Clean Air Act. Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA is responsible for
both plan development and implementation. Such a top-down
approach is not likely to yield an effective regulatory structure to
improve water quality. Indeed, there is considerable evidence
suggesting that water quality planning is most successful when a
broad-based participatory process including all stakeholders is
employed.485 [W]ithout the support or involvement of the public,
particularly at the state level . . ., water protection programs are
bound to drift aimlessly and ultimately fail. 486 As Wesley Jarrell has
noted:
To be most effective, the citizens should be involved at all
levels in the devlopment, implementation, monitoring, and
evaluation of TMDLs. Though an expensive and timeconsuming way to start discussions over TMDLs, getting
landowners and land users involved is the critical component
in making the watershed approach successful. The political
battles and finger pointing that mark many water quality
discussions can be harnessed into productive dialogue if
483. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (2001).
484. See generally William F. Pedersen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 1059 (1981).
485. See JARRELL, GETTING STARTED, supra note 16, at 9.
486. Wagner, supra note 21, at 432.
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skillfully facilitated and initiated at the beginning of the
TMDL process.487
Plan development would roughly resemble a negotiated
rulemaking culminating in an EPA-proposed rule subject to notice
and comment procedures. Several models are available for organizing
effective institutions for rule development and implementation. For
example, the USDA s Natural Resource Conservation Service
(NRCS) has initiated a Coordinated Resource Management and
Planning (CRMP) training program that has spawned watershed
planning groups in various parts of the country. These groups operate
under Four Cardinal Rules : (1) broad community involvement; (2)
a commitment to finding solutions; (3) consensus-based
decisionmaking; and (4) [e]xpressing needs, not positions. 488
In the Tualatin River Watershed, the TMDL planning process
involved designated management agencies for each of the three
categories of land users that contributed to phosphorous loading in
the river: agriculture, forestry, and urban systems. A Technical
Advisory committee was established to assist with agricultural issues,
but membership in the committee rapidly grew to include
representatives of urban systems and forestry, as well as Oregon
[Department of Environmental Quality]. 489 In addition, a Tualatin
River Research Advisory Committee was established. This
Committee facilitated rapid and effective implementation of
decisions concerning monitoring and best management practices.490
Plans would have to satisfy certain minimum criteria. First and
foremost, the plan would have to be promulgated by a certain date
and demonstrate attainment of water quality standards by a certain
date. The duty to promulgate the plan would be subject to citizen suit
enforcement against the EPA. With deadlines and the threat of
citizen-initiated litigation, stakeholders would be highly motivated to
reach agreement.
Plan requirements could be based on a classification system tied
to the extent of the pollution problems faced in the respective
487.
488.
489.
490.

JARRELL, GETTING STARTED, supra note 16, at 10.
See id. at 11.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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watersheds. This approach follows the lead of the Clean Air Act s
program for ozone nonattainment areas.491 A key element of plans for
impaired waters would include reasonable further progress
milestones, requiring step-wise, specific levels of incremental
reductions in key pollutant loadings within particular time frames.
For example, water bodies suffering from excess nutrient loadings
would be required to demonstrate specific percentage reductions in
total loadings of nitrogen and phosphorous by particular dates.492 If
the implemented plan proves inadequate to attain water quality
standards, additional mandatory requirements would apply.493
The EPA would defer to choices made by watershed planning
institutions that establish appropriate mixes of controls to meet basic
plan requirements, so long as the controls can be demonstrated to
achieve water quality objectives and so long as certain baseline
levels of controls are imposed on certain categories of sources.
Where appropriate, pollutant trading systems, including pointnonpoint and nonpoint-nonpoint trading programs, could be
employed to achieve load reductions at least cost.494 Once adopted,
however, the choice of control measures would be subject to direct
federal and citizen enforcement.
491. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7511a (2001).
492. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(1)(B) (imposing reasonable further progress requirement
of annual reductions in volatile organic compound emissions of three percent, averaged over
each consecutive three-year period until air quality standard is attained).
493. See id. §§ 7511(b)(2), 7511a(i) (areas failing to attain are reclassified and subject to
new classification s control requirements).
494. For examples of trading programs involving agricultural pollutants and a framework
for developing effective trading programs, see FAETH, FERTILE GROUND, supra note 103;
Susan A. Austin, Designing a Nonpoint Source Selenium Load Trading Program, 25 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 337 (2001). A variety of trading programs have been suggested including a
fertilizer cap and trade program, see Ruhl, supra note 5, at 345-46; and a tradeable coupon
system under which each coupon would entitle a farmer to one ton of soil erosion. D. L. Hoag
& H. A. Holloway, Farm Production Decisions Under Cross and Conservation Compliance, 27
AM. J. OF AGRI. ECON., 184 (1991). However, opportunities for effective point-nonpoint
trading programs appear to be quite limited. A USDA report notes that less than ten percent of
impaired water bodies are affected by both point and nonpoint sources. Peter M. Feather &
Joseph Cooper, Voluntary Incentives for Reducing Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water
Pollution, USDA Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 716, at 3 (May 1995), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib716/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).
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C. Eliminating The CWA s Regulatory Exemptions for Agriculture
Controls developed through the watershed planning process
described above would be incorporated into the overall NPDES
program, with the allocation of cleanup responsibilities set forth in
individual or general permits issued either by state or federal
permitting authorities. A number of agricultural sources currently
regarded as nonpoint sources should, however, be recharacterized
as point sources. These sources should, regardless of specific
choices made in a watershed plan, be subject to conventional
regulation under the technology-based, NPDES permit system. Chief
among these sources are certain irrigation return flows, some
agricultural stormwater discharges, and AFOs. The environmental
safe harbors that these sources currently enjoy expressed as
exemptions from NPDES program should simply be eliminated.495
With regard to these sources, the EPA s proposed CAFO
regulations, as noted above, are a substantial step in the right
direction, but still exempt a large number of sources from the NPDES
program. Appropriate reforms should, as Professor Adler has
suggested, draw upon analogous policies implemented in the Clean
Air Act.496 For example, drawing upon the Clean Air Act s Title V
permit program, individual permits could be required for all major
CAFOs,497 with the remaining CAFOs subject to general permit
conditions.498 The definition of a major CAFO may vary depending
on whether and the extent to which potentially affected water bodies
currently are deemed to be impaired. 499 For example, in areas
where waters are fully supporting designated uses, the EPA s
proposed thresholds for CAFO status might be treated as the
appropriate criteria for a major CAFO. Tighter thresholds for
major status, perhaps as low as one hundred animal units for
major status, could be applied in areas where waters are deemed to
495. See Ruhl, supra note 5, at 335-37 (suggesting a sector-based integrated permitting
program for CAFOs and large-scale crop operations ).
496. See generally Adler, supra note 2.
497. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a) (requiring permits for, inter alia, major sources ).
498. See id. § 7661c(d) (authorizing general permits for numerous similar sources ).
499. Cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a(c), (d), and (e) (varying definition of major source
depending on severity of ozone air pollution problem).
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be impaired.
A similar approach could be used for crop farming that involves
discharges of polluted irrigation return flows or collected agricultural
stormwater.500 Major sources requiring individual permits could be
based on water quality conditions and the amount of acreage placed
into production. Default effluent limitations would likely take the
form of design standards based on best management practices. Permit
writers could draw upon the EPA s guidance developed for the
Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Act Amendments nonpoint source
control program to assign specific permit conditions.501
The advantages to this approach are chiefly that these sources
would become subject to enforceable permit conditions and
enforcement actions initiated by state or federal authorities or by
affected citizens utilizing the CWA s citizen suit provision. This
enhanced enforcement threat would provide powerful incentives for
these sources to abide by the terms and conditions of their individual
or general NPDES permits.
D. Cost-Sharing Programs
Existing programs provide opportunities to distribute the costs of
implementing best management practices and other forms of controls
in ways that may make the transition to a regulatory program for
agriculture more politically acceptable. Cost-sharing and land
retirement programs should be retained and funding of these
programs should be substantially increased in the short-term. In
500. It is important to note that only irrigation return flows and stormwater discharges that
can properly be described as point source discharges would be subject to the NPDES. For
example, [c]ourts have held that rainwater runoff from the surface is not pollution from a point
source, but rainwater collected by ditches, gullies, or other conveyances that result from [a
person s] activities is pollution from a point source. Karen M. McGaffey et al., Enforcement in
THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 198-99 (Parthenia B. Evans ed., 1994) (citing Sierra Club
v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.,
599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979); Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 630
(D.R.I. 1990)).
501. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Guidance Specifying Management
Measures for Sources of Nonpoint Pollution in Coastal Waters, ch. 2, Management Measures
for Agricultural Sources, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/MMGI/Chapter2/
index.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).
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addition, it would be useful to establish a general revolving low-cost
loan fund, offering farmers opportunities to finance water pollution
control measures. The fund could be established and enlarged
through a reasonable tax on the agricultural inputs that are most
prone to abuse and contribute to water quality impairments. For
example, a reasonable tax on fertilizers, pesticides, and high-nutrient
feed for confined animal operations would both help to defray the
costs of implementing pollution control measures and provide
incentives for wiser use of these inputs.
CONCLUSION
For the past several decades, the nation s reliance on voluntary,
incentive-based programs for controlling agricultural nonpoint source
water pollution has not yielded satisfactory improvements in water
quality. We should begin to effect a baseline shift that removes the
implicit and explicit entitlements that currently permit those in
agriculture to pollute. The resulting regulatory program should
encourage broad-based participatory planning at the watershed level,
minimize institutional impediments to effective regulatory programs,
and most importantly yield control measures that can be enforced by
state and federal authorities, as well as by affected citizens through
the CWA s citizen suit provision. We should try to ease the transition
costs of the shift by generously funding existing land retirement and
cost-share programs, as well as creating a revolving loan fund that
farmers can tap into to finance the implementation of sustainable
management practices. In the end, however, we must be prepared to
use the force of law to clean up our nation s waters. We can tolerate
nothing less than fishable, swimmable waters, and our children
deserve at least the assurance that we have committed ourselves to
creating a pathway toward sustainable agricultural practices.
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